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This Comment argues that Castro Alfaro and the limitations it imposes on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in international tort litigation reflect an accurate interpretation of the statute
and appropriate consideration of policy implications. Part I presents the background of forum non
conveniens, jurisdiction, and venue. Part I also discusses specific jurisdiction and specific venue
statutes in the United States and Texas. Part II discusses the background events of Castro Alfaro,
the majority opinion, and the various concurring and dissenting opinions. Part III argues that the
Castro Alfaro court based its decision on proper statutory interpretation and sound international
policy. This Comment concludes that the Castro Alfaro decision will support the resolution of
international tort litigation by suppressing the doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases where
legislatures have provided for subject matter jurisdiction and venue in specific causes of action.
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY v. CASTRO ALFARO: THE
DEMISE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN




U.S. federal and state courts utilize the doctrine of forum
non conveniens to dismiss cases over which they otherwise have
jurisdiction.' Both federal and state legislatures, however,
have enacted specific jurisdiction statutes that create subject
matter jurisdiction for courts to hear particular kinds of cases.2
These statutes often conflict with the doctrine offorum non con-
veniens when courts use the doctrine to defeat statutorily cre-
ated jurisdiction.' In Dow Chemical Company v. Castro Alfaro,4 an
1. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) (applyingforum non conveniens analysis to War-
saw Convention case); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 Ohio St.
3d 123, 519 N.E.2d 370 (1988); see infra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing doctrine of forum non conveniens). Black's Law Dictionary defines the doctrine as
"the discretionary power of [the] court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of
parties and ends ofjustice would be better served if action were brought and tried in
another forum." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). The Federal Employers Liability Act
("FELA") states that
an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the
district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of com-
mencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
States.
Id. § 56; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
3. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (discussingforum non
conveniens dismissal under FELA). The federal circuit and district courts are currently
divided as to the application of forum non conveniens to actions brought under the
Jones Act. See Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1990)
(maintaining that federal defense of forum non conveniens overrides state laws not rec-
ognizing doctrine); In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) (acknowledging use of forum non con-
veniens in Jones Act cases, but upholding trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss for forum non conveniens); Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Norway, 719
F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983) (holdingforum non conveniens dismissal proper);
Szumlicz v. Norwegian Am. Line, Inc., 698 F.2d 1192, 1195 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding
that if U.S. law applies to suit, U.S. court should retain jurisdiction); Koupetoris v.
Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392, 1397 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirmingforum non con-
veniens dismissal); Dalla v. Atlas Maritime Co., 562 F. Supp. 752, 758 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(noting that because Jones Act applied, district court must retain jurisdiction), aff'd,
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international tort case, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a
specific jurisdiction statute5 barred a forum non conveniens dis-
missal .6
This Comment argues that Castro Alfaro and the limitations
it imposes on the doctrine of forum non conveniens in interna-
tional tort litigation reflect an accurate interpretation of the
statute and appropriate consideration of policy implications.
Part I presents the background offorum non conveniens, jurisdic-
tion, and venue. Part I also discusses specific jurisdiction and
specific venue statutes in the United States and Texas. Part II
discusses the background events of Castro Alfaro, the majority
opinion, and the various concurring and dissenting opinions.
Part III argues that the Castro Alfaro court based its decision on
proper statutory interpretation and sound international policy.
This Comment concludes that the Castro Alfaro decision will
support the resolution of international tort litigation by sup-
pressing the doctrine offorum non conveniens in cases where leg-
islatures have provided for subject matter jurisdiction and
venue in specific causes of action.
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS, JURISDICTION, AND
VENUE IN THE UNITED STATES AND TEXAS
The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives a court discre-
771 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985); see also 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988) (codifyingJones Act).
The Jones Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over seamen suffering personal inju-
ries in the district where the defendant employer resides or where the employer
maintains its principal office. Id.
4. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
5. A specific jurisdiction statute confers subject matter jurisdiction on a court to
hear a particular kind of case. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing specific jurisdiction and specific venue statutes). The Castro Alfaro court consid-
ered the impact of the Texas Wrongful Death Statute (the "Texas Statute") on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 677-79; see TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
6. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679. The five to four decision affirmed an appel-
late decision. See Castro Alfaro v. Dow Chem. Co., 751 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.
1988), aff'd, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). Both
decisions provoked an immediate response from commentators, much of it negative.
See Fisher, Alfaro Case Did the Right Thing, Tex. Law., June 30, 1990, at 30; Wiehl, Texas
Courts Opened to Foreign Damage Cases, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, at B6, col. 3; Note,
Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro: Forum Non Conveniens-Now Isn't That Convenient?, 42
BAYLOR L. REV. 375 (1990); Note, A Foreign Plaintiff Has an Absolute Right to Maintain a
Personal Injury Cause of Action in Texas Without Being Subject to Forum Non Conveniens Dis-
missal, 20 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 995 (1989).
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tion to dismiss or transfer a case if another, more convenient
forum exists. 7 The U.S. government, and some U.S. states,
have codifiedforum non conveniens.8 Other states employ it as a
common law doctrine.9 Some states, however, do not recog-
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1969). The Restatement
notes that "[a] state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient fo-
rum for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is available to
the plaintiff." Id. The Restatement further states that
the suit will be entertained, no matter how inappropriate the forum may be,
if the defendant cannot be subjected to jurisdiction in other states. The
same will be true if the plaintiff's cause of action would elsewhere be barred
by the statute of limitations, unless the court is willing to accept the defend-
ant's stipulation that he will not raise this defense in the second state.
Id. comment c. Another description states that
the forum non conveniens doctrine . . . permits a court having jurisdiction
over an action to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when the litigation could
be brought more appropriately in another forum .... [Dlismissal on the
basis of forum non conveniens also requires that there be an alternative fo-
rum in which the suit can be prosecuted. It must appear that jurisdiction
over all parties can be secured and that complete relief can be obtained in
the supposedly more convenient court.
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 88-89 (student ed. 1985); see
infra note 13 (discussing development of doctrine).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); AtA. CODE § 6-5-430 (1990); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 410.30 (West Ann. 1973); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 123(B) & (C) (West
Supp. 1990); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.12 (1990);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 801.52 & 801.63 (West Supp. 1990).
The text of the federal forum non conveniens statute provides that "[flor the con-
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may trans-
fer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). The New York codification of forum non con-
veniens states that:
(a) When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any
party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions
that may be just. The domicile or residence in this state of any party to the
action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule, the
court shall not stay or dismiss any action on the ground of inconvenient
forum, where the action arises out of or relates to a contract, agreement or
undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the general obligations laws applies,
and the parties to the contract have agreed that the law of this state shall
govern their rights or duties in whole or in part.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327 (McKinney 1990).
9. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486
P.2d 184 (1971); Country Pride Foods, Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648
S.W.2d 485 (1983); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Lohn, 192 Colo. 200, 557 P.2d 373
(1976); Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 576 A.2d 518 (1990);
Miller v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Norway, 537 A.2d 190 (Del. 1988); Houston v. Cald-
well, 359 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1978); Allen v. Allen, 64 Hawaii 553, 645 P.2d 300 (1982);
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nize the doctrine, either by statute or common law.' 0 Because
U.S. federal and state courts cannot transfer a case to a foreign
court, the doctrine offorum non conveniens leads to the dismissal
of international litigation in U.S. federal courts and those state
courts that recognize the doctrine."
A. The History of Forum Non Conveniens
1. Forum Non Conveniens in U.S. Courts
In this century, U.S. courts have gradually accepted the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.12 A doctrine of obscure ori-
Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 563 N.E.2d 465 (1990);
Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 303 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1981); Volt Delta Re-
sources, Inc. v. Devine, 241 Kan. 775, 740 P.2d 1089 (1987); Skidmore v. Meade, 676
S.W.2d 793 (Ky. 1984); Corning v. Corning, 563 A.2d 379 (Me. 1989); Johnson v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 314 Md. 521, 552 A.2d 29 (1989); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 407 Mass. 572, 555 N.E.2d 214 (1990); Anderson v. Great
Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 411 Mich. 619, 309 N.W.2d 539 (1981); Searles v.
Searles, 420 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. 1988); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Tircuit, 554 So. 2d
878 (Miss. 1989); Willman v. McMillen, 779 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. 1989); Qualley v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 191 Neb. 787, 217 N.W.2d 914 (1974); Cariaga v. EighthJudi-
cial Dist. Court, 104 Nev. 544, 762 P.2d 886 (1988); Stankunas v. Stankunas, 582
A.2d 280 (N.H. 1990); D'Agostino v. Johnson &Johnson, Inc., 115 N.J. 491, 559
A.2d 420 (1989); Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155
(1988); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 Ohio St. 3d 123, 519
N.E.2d 370 (1988); G.S. v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 65 (Okla. 1990); State ex rel. Academy
Press, Ltd. v. Beckett, 282 Or. 701, 581 P.2d 496 (1978); Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa.
509, 556 A.2d 827 (1989); Mansour v. Mansour, 296 S.C. 215, 371 S.E.2d 537
(1988); Zurick v. Inman, 221 Tenn. 393, 426 S.W.2d 767 (1968); Kish v. Wright, 562
P.2d 625 (Utah 1977); Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 134 Vt. 211, 356 A.2d 506
(1976); Myers v. Boeing Co., 115 Wash. 2d 123, 794 P.2d 1272 (1990); Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Tsapis, 400 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1990).
10. See Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1985); Southern Ry.
Co. v. Goodman, 259 Ga. 339, 380 S.E.2d 460 (1989); Marco Distrib., Inc. v. Biehl,
97 Idaho 853, 555 P.2d 393 (1976); Haug v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 236 Mont. 368,
770 P.2d 517 (1989); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987); Dow Chem. Co.
v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991);
Caldwell v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc., 238 Va. 148, 380 S.E.2d 910 (1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1976).
11. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 7, at 87-91. This book
summarizes forum non conveniens dismissals, noting that
[iut is only when the more convenient forum is in a foreign country-or per-
haps, under rare circumstance, is a state court-that a suit brought in a
proper federal venue will be dismissed on grounds of forum non con-
veniens. In contrast, the doctrine of forum non conveniens continues to
play an important role in the state courts because a court in one state cannot
transfer a case to a court in another state.
Id. at 91.
12. See Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377
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gin,"3 forum non conveniens first entered U.S. law as a legal term
in 1929.14 Prior to 1929, U.S. courts had been applyingforum
non conveniens as a nameless principle of law through which a
court could decline to exercise jurisdiction, particularly in mar-
itime cases between a foreign plaintiff and foreign defendant. 1 5
Despite approval from the U.S. Supreme Court in 1929,6 state
and federal courts did not begin to employforum non conveniens
widely except in maritime cases, and cases involving the inter-
nal affairs of a corporation.17
(1929); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932); Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty, 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); see also Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929) (stating that U.S. courts
have applied forum non conveniens in principle since nineteenth century).
13. See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 386
(1947). No trace of the doctrine appears in Roman or continental law. Id. Forum non
conveniens grew out of the doctrine offorum non competens in Scottish law. Id. Scottish
courts found they had no jurisdiction in two instances: first, in cases where parties
were non-residents; second, in cases where Scotland was an inconvenient forum. Id.
at 387 n.35. Subsequently, courts invented forum non conveniens to replace forum non
competens when jurisdiction clearly existed and only a question of discretion remained.
Id.
14. See Barrett, supra note 13, at 388. Although commentators credit Mr. Blair
with bringing the doctrine of forum non conveniens into U.S. law, his article did not
produce widespread increase in the use offorum non conveniens, particularly at the state
level. See Blair, supra note 12; see also Barrett, supra note 13, at 393 (noting no in-
crease in use offorum non conveniens after Mr. Blair's article).
15. See Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817) (holding that exercise of
jurisdiction in maritime transitory causes of action rests in sound discretion of court);
Waisikoski v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 173 A.D. 538, 159 N.Y.S. 906
(2d Dep't 1916) (holding that trial court has discretion to entertain or refuse tort
action brought under subject matter jurisdiction statute), affd, 228 N.Y. 581, 127
N.E. 923 (1920); Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515,
517 (1930) (noting that district court has discretion whether to retain jurisdiction of
admiralty suit between foreign parties); see also Blair, supra note 12, at 22 (noting early
use of forum non conveniens); Barrett, supra note 13, at 395 (noting development of
forum non conveniens). Another commentator, however, considers Mr. Blair's conclu-
sions regarding the development offorum non conveniens in the nineteenth century as
questionable. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine.,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 796 n.43 (1985). Professor Stein maintains that many early
state cases relied on by Mr. Blair were decided under rules that absolutely denied
jurisdiction in the case at hand. Id.
16. See Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377
(1929) (holding that state use offorum non conveniens does not violate Privileges and
Immunities Clause of article IV of U.S. Constitution). This suit, like many others
involving retention of jurisdiction, concerned an action brought by an employee
against an employer railroad under FELA. Id. at 385.
17. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 419 (1932) (not-
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In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth an analytical
framework for the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Gulf Oil
Corporation v. Gilbert. 8 In Gilbert, the Court held that the forum
non conveniens analysis must balance the private interests of the
litigants and the public interests of the forum against the plain-
tiff's interest in choosing the forum.' 9 The Court, however,
established three factors that the trial court must consider
ing that courts have discretion to decline to hear case between foreigners if justice
could serve foreigners in their home forum despite admiralty jurisdiction); Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (upholding dismissal of case involv-
ing internal affairs of defendant corporation). In Rogers, the Court noted that "juris-
diction will be declined whenever considerations of convenience, efficiency and jus-
tice point to the courts of the State of the domicile as appropriate tribunals for the
determination of the particular case." Id. at 131; see Barrett, supra note 13, at 393.
The doctrine developed in the United States largely to curb widespread forum
shopping by plaintiff employees who sought the fora of large, urban centers sympa-
thetic to their claims. See Barrett, supra note 13, at 382-83. The legislature, however,
made these fora available through statutes such as FEIA, the venue provision of
which Congress enacted in 1910. See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1988); supra note 2 (setting
forth text of section 56). Courts adopted the doctrine, even though, in the latter half
of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth, the railroads bore the stigma
that today attaches to many large corporations. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. United States, 244 U.S. 336, 342 (1917) (noting that U.S. Congress enacted
FELA as result of excessive casualties in railroad transportation due to railroad abuse
of employees); see C. DICKENS, DOMBEY & SON (1847-1848) (portraying railroads as
destructive influence in Victorian England); F. NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS (1901) (por-
traying railroad as mechanical monster crushing helpless individuals). The Castro Al-
faro case also reflects the struggle of the individual against the corporation, as does
much international tort litigation. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d
674, 688-89 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991);
see also In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). In Union Carbide, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld the district court'sforum non conveniens dismissal of the
litigation resulting from a gas leak catastrophe in Bhopal, India. Id. at 197. The
catastrophe claimed the lives of 2,000 people and injured 200,000, making it "the
most devastating industrial disaster in history." Id.
18. 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (noting that district court has inherent power pursuant
to doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss suit brought under general venue stat-
ute); see Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (upholding
forum non conveniens dismissal of case involving internal affairs of defendant corpora-
tion).
19. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09. The Gilbert case involved a diversity action in
which a Virginia citizen brought a tort action in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York against a Pennsylvania corporation authorized to do busi-
ness in New York and Virginia. Id. at 503. The plaintiff alleged that defendant's
negligent delivery of gasoline to the plaintiff's warehouse tanks in Virginia caused
the explosion and fire that destroyed his warehouse. Id. at 502-03. The U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the district court's dismissal of the case. Id. at 512.
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before beginning the forum non conveniens analysis. 20  First, a
court must have jurisdiction to hear the case.2 ' Second, the
venue of the court must be proper.22 Finally, the defendant
must be amenable to process in another forum.23 If the litiga-
tion meets these prerequisites, the court may consider a forum
non conveniens dismissal.24
The Gilbert Court held that in determining the appropri-
ateness of a forum non conveniens transfer or dismissal, a trial
court must weigh the private interests of the litigants. 25 The
Court listed several factors for trial courts to consider.26 Trial
courts should consider the accessibility of witnesses and evi-
dence.27 Additionally, courts should consider the problems of
delay, expense, and fairness if the case is litigated in the cur-
rent forum.28 Furthermore, courts should consider the en-
forceability of any judgment they might grant.29
Moreover, the Gilbert Court enumerated the public interest
factors that courts should consider in a forum non conveniens
analysis.3 0 Generally, courts should consider the forum's in-
20. Id. at 504-07.
21. Id. at 504; see Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 685 (Tex.
1990) (Doggett, J., concurring), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 671 (1991).
22. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947); see Castro Alfaro, 786
S.W,2d at 685 (Doggett, J., concurring). After 1948, the trial court could also trans-
fer the case to another district in which venue was proper and the forum convenient.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
23. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, did not address
the issue of the adequacy of the alternative forum. See generally id. The Court would
not address that issue until 1981. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981).
24. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 504-07.
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id.
27. Id. In Gilbert, the Court noted that the sources of proof, such as firemen,
contractors, and customers of the plaintiff, were located in Virginia. d. at 511. The
Court also stated that the district court should consider the availability of process for
compelling the attendance of unwilling witnesses. Id. at 508. In Gilbert, all the wit-
nesses, except experts, resided in Virginia. Id. at 511. If the case were heard in New
York, the litigants could not compel personal attendance of these Virginia witnesses
and would have to rely on depositions. Id. The court may also consider the conven-
ience of viewing the physical premises that might be related to the litigation. Id. at
508. The district court in New York could not readily view the destroyed warehouse
in Virginia that was the site of the alleged tort. See id. at 503 & 511.
28. Id. at 508.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 508-09.
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terest in the litigation." The Gilbert Court also stated that the
most appropriate forum should be the one whose law applies
to the litigation. 2
The framework developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Gilbert stresses two points.3 First, courts should defer to the
plaintiff's choice of forum. 4 Second, courts should not allow
the plaintiff to vex, harass, or oppress the defendant by choos-
ing an inconvenient forum." A proper forum non conveniens
analysis should determine where a trial would be most conve-
nient and just for both parties.36
In 1948, the U.S. Congress codified the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in a statute that permits a district court to trans-
fer a civil action to another district or division. 37 The use of
common lawforum non conveniens to dismiss a case thus became
limited to state courts, and to federal courts in cases where the
alternative forum is a foreign country.38 This latter situation
provided an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to define
the doctrine further in-Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 9
Reyno involved a fatal air crash in Scotland in which many
31. Id. at 509. The Court stated that "[tlhere is a local interest in having local-
ized controversies decided at home." Id. The Court found no New York interest in
the litigation at hand. Id. at 509-12. It stated that the trial court should also consider
the burden of the litigation on its congested docket. Id. at 508. The Gilbert Court,
however, did not analyze this factor in terms of the facts of the case at hand. See id. at
509-12. Another factor that the court may consider is the burden ofjury duty on the
community. Id. at 508-09. In Gilbert, the district court had rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the Virginia jury would be more intimidated than a New York jury by
the US$400,000 amount in controversy. Id. at 510. The U.S. Supreme Court also
rejected this argument and noted no reason for a New York jury to entertain the case.
Id.
32. Id. at 509. The Gilbert Court noted that "[tihe course of adjudication in New
York federal court might be beset with conflict of laws problems all avoided if the
case is litigated in Virginia where it arose." Id. at 512.
33. Id. at 508 (discussing forum non conveniens analysis).
34. Id. The Court noted that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the de-
fendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Id.
35. Id. The Court noted that "the plaintiff may not by choice of an inconvenient
forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy." Id.
36. See id. at 507; see also Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518,
527 (1947). The Koster Court stated that "the ultimate inquiry is where trial will best
serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see supra note 8 (containing text of section
1404(a)).
38. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 7, at 91.
39. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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witnesses and much evidence remained in the United King-
dom.40 In Reyno, the plaintiff brought suit in the United States
because Scottish law did not recognize strict liability in tort.4 '
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the district court's forum non
conveniens dismissal even though the defendant manufacturers
of the plane and propeller were U.S. corporations.42
The Reyno Court clarified a number of forum non conveniens
issues that arise when a foreign country is the alternative fo-
rum.43 The Court held that although the prerequisite of an
alternative forum still exists, the trial court should not give
conclusive or substantial weight to the possibility of different
substantive law in the alternate forum.44 In addition, the Reyno
Court found that the plaintiff's right to choose a forum de-
creases if the plaintiff is foreign."5 The Reyno Court also noted,
however, that the need to apply foreign law in a U.S. forum is a
factor favoring dismissal only when other Gilbert factors favor
dismissal.46 Finally, the Reyno Court clarified that to justify dis-
missal the trial need only be burdensome to the defendant, not
fundamentally unfair."7 The Reyno. Court, like the Gilbert
40. Id. at 242. The deceased were Scottish citizens, and the plaintiff was the U.S.
representative of the estates of the victims. Id. at 239-40. The defendants were the
Pennsylvania manufacturer of the plane and the Ohio manufacturer of the propeller.
Id. at 239. A company organized in the United Kingdom owned, registered, and
maintained the plane while a Scottish company operated the plane. Id. An error by
the Scottish pilot might have caused the crash. Id. The British Department of Trade
investigated the accident and the preliminary report pointed to propeller failure. Id.
All wreckage remained in England. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in employing the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
d. at 261.
41. Id. at 240.
42. Id. at 260-61.
43. Id. at 247.
44. Id. Under Scottish law, the decedents' relatives could bring a wrongful
death action only for "loss of support and society." Id. at 240. As a result, plaintiff
argued that Scotland did not provide an adequate alternative forum. Id. at 251. The
Court rejected this argument. Id. The Court concluded that "[t]he possibility of a
change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substan-
tial weight in theforum non conveniens inquiry." Id. at 247.
45. Id. at 265; see Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Standards for the Dismissal of Actions
from United States Federal Courts to Foreign Tribunals, 5 FORDAM INT'L L.J. 533, 564
(1982) (concluding that Reyno discourages manipulation of U.S. judicial system by
foreign plaintiffs and that foreign plaintiffs' choice of U.S. forum "should be ac-
corded little, if any, weight").
46. Id. at 260 n.29. The Reyno Court also stated that the trial court's discretion
is reversible only upon a clear showing of abuse. Id. at 257.
47. Id. at 259.
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Court, did not deal with specific venue statutes.48
2. Forum Non Conveniens in Texas
Texas courts initially applied the doctrine offorum non con-
veniens without using it by name.49 At the turn of the century,
the courts declined jurisdiction over transitory causes of action
for a number of reasons, all of which are factors in the current
forum non conveniens analysis.5 ° For instance, courts declined ju-
risdiction over cases that required the application of the law of
another state or country having substantially different law than
Texas.5 This ground for dismissal, known as the dissimilarity
doctrine, mirrors the choice of law factor in forum non con-
48. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (M.D. Pa. 1979),
rev'd, 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The Supreme Court in
Gilbert specifically noted that
in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act we have held that plain-
tiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on the basis of forum non con-
veniens. But this was because the special venue act under which those cases
are brought was believed to require it. Those decisions do not purport to
modify the doctrine as to other cases governed by the general venue stat-
utes.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947) (citations omitted); see infra notes
77-79 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction); infra note 83 and accompany-
ing text (discussing venue); infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing spe-
cific jurisdiction statutes and specific venue statutes).
49. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing forum non conveniens
in Texas).
50. Compare Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co. v.Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896)
and Southern Pac. Co. v. Graham, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 34 S.W. 135 (1896) and
Morris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 17, 14 S.W. 228 (1890) with Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The Texas Supreme Court defined a transitory
cause of action by stating that -[i]f the cause of action be one that might have arisen
anywhere, then it is transitory; if it could only have arisen in one place, then it is
local." Morris, 78 Tex. at 20, 14 S.W. at 229. The Texas Supreme Court later stated
that a transitory action may be maintained in any place where the defendant is found
if no reason exists for the court not to entertain jurisdiction. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33
S.W. 857.
51. See Jackson, 89 Tex. at 113, 33 S.W. at 860-61. The court specifically noted
that "[the decisions of this court . . . establish the doctrine that the courts of this
state will not undertake to adjudicate rights which originated in another state or
country, under statutes materially different from the law of this state in relation to the
same subject." Id.
Jackson involved an injured employee who sued his employer, a Mexican railroad
that extended into Texas, for negligence causing injuries he sustained in Mexico. Id.
at 113, 33 S.W. at 857. Under the lex loci delicti rule that required the court to apply
the law of the place where the tort occurred, the court found that Mexican law ap-
plied and that Mexican negligence law was sufficiently dissimilar to Texas law as to
require dismissal of the case. Id. at 113-16, 33 S.W. at 860-61. The court also dis-
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veniens.5 2 The Texas Supreme Court also declined jurisdiction
on the ground ofjudicial comity-deference to the interests of
another forum in the legal controversy.5" Judicial comity over-
laps the forum non conveniens consideration of the forum's inter-
est in the litigation.54
Moreover, Texas courts dismissed cases where they had
jurisdiction over the defendants but the parties were non-resi-
dents and the causes of action' originated outside Texas.55
Texas courts also considered whether another forum had juris-
diction over the defendant and whether the other forum could
better adjudicate the plaintiff's rights. 6 In addition, the Texas
missed the case on other grounds. Id. at 116-17, 33 S.W. at 861-62; see infra notes 56-
58 and accompanying text (discussing other factors in Jackson dismissal).
52. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947); supra note 32 and
accompanying text (discussing forum non conveniens choice of law factor).
53. Morris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 17, 14 S.W. 228 (1890). The plain-
tiff in Morris, a U.S. citizen, became a resident of the Choctaw nation in the Indian
Territory through marriage. Id. at 17, 14 S.W. at 228. He sued the defendant rail-
road, a Missouri corporation with an office and agent in Texas, for fire damage
caused by defendant's locomotive to his personal property in the Indian Territory.
Id. The court dismissed the case because the federal government, having jurisdiction
over the Indian Territory, had the primary interest in the case. Id. at 22, 14 S.W. at
230. The court noted that "Ujurisdiction is entertained in such cases only upon prin-
ciples of comity, and not as a matter of right." Id.; see Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co. v.
Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896). The court in Jackson also relied on comity
principles in dismissing the plaintiff's case against a Mexican railroad, as well as on
the ground that suit in Mexico would best serve public interest. Id. at 117, 33 S.W. at
861.
54. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing
forum non conveniens public interest factors).
55. See Morris, 89 Tex. at 21, 14 S.W. at 230. The Morris court stated that "it has
been held in such [transitory] actions, where the parties were non-residents and the
cause of action originated beyond the limits of the state, these facts would justify the
court in refusing to entertain jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted).
This discretionary nature ofjurisdiction that is the essence offorum non conveniens
appears in Southern Pac. Co. v. Graham, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 34 S.W. 135 (1896).
In Graham, the New Mexico plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a foreign corporation
with an agent in El Paso, caused the destruction of his real and personal property in
New Mexico. Id. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals noted that the district court had
jurisdiction over the transitory cause of action involving the plaintiff's personal prop-
erty. Id. at 568, 34 S.W. at 137. The Texas appeals court upheld the district court's
decision to hear the case, noting that "had the district court, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, refused to entertain jurisdiction of the case at all, this court would
not have felt called upon to review its action." Id. at 567-68, 34 S.W. at 135. The
appeals court also noted that when the district court "assumed jurisdiction, its action
[would] not be disturbed in the absence of any facts tending to show that there was
an abuse of discretion." Id.
56. See Jackson, 89 Tex. at 116, 33 S.W. at 861.
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courts weighed the factors of public interest and justice." Fi-
nally, even at the turn of the century, Texas courts considered
the question of overburdened court dockets in deciding
whether to dismiss a case.5" These factors are all components
of the U.S. Supreme Court's forum non conveniens analysis. 59
In this century, Texas courts dismissed cases under the
dissimilarity doctrine60 and theforum non conveniens doctrine.6'
In 1979, however, the Texas Supreme Court abolished the dis-
similarity doctrine.62 Texas courts applied forum non conveniens
only sporadically after 1979.63 Finally, in March of 1990, the
57. See id. at 116-17, 33 S.W. at 861 (considering grounds of Mexico's public
interest, and justice not demanding that Texas exercise jurisdiction); Missouri, Kan.
& Tex, Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Godair Comm'n Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 298, 299, 87 S.W.
871, 872 (1905) (affirming district court's refusal to dismiss because district court
had "determined the question of public policy in favor of entertaining jurisdiction").
58. See Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 117, 33 S.W. 857, 862
(1896); Graham, 12 Tex. Civ. App. at 572, 34 S.W. at 138. TheJackson court noted
that "[i]f the facts showed that [hearing the case] was necessary in order to secure
justice, and the laws were such as we could properly enforce, this consideration [of
overburdened dockets] would have but little weight; but we feel that it is entitled to
be considered where the plaintiff chooses this jurisdiction as a matter of convenience,
and not of necessity." Jackson, 89 Tex. at 118, 33 S.W. at 862. The Graham court, in
affirming the El Paso district court's maintenance of jurisdiction, noted that the case
would place no burden on the El Paso court docket. Graham, 12 Tex. Civ. App. at
572, 34 S.W. at 138.
59. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text (discussing forum non conveniens
analysis of U.S. Supreme Court).
60. See Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (holding that no
Texas jurisdiction over personal injury/negligence action arises out of plane crash in
Mexico involving Texas plaintiff and defendant due to material differences between
Texan and Mexican law), writ ref'd; El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, 255
S W. 159 (Comm. App. of Tex. 1923) (stating that laws of Texas and Mexico suffi-
ciently different as to require dismissal for lack of jurisdiction).
61. See Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962) (reversing trial court's dis-
missal on ground offorum non conveniens); Corliss v. Smith, 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977) (holding that no automatic assumption ofjurisdiction exists despite long-
arm statute when practical considerations warrant otherwise); Cherokee Village v.
Henderson, 538 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (forum non conveniens not available
where parties are residents of state), writ dismissed; Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 341 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (holding thatforum non conveniens
provided ground for dismissal of action brought by Colorado partnership against
Missouri railroad for damages to fruit shipped on defendant's railroad through
Texas), writ dismissed.
62. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979).
63. See, e.g., Acacia Pipeline Corp. v. Champlin Exploration, Inc., 769 S.W.2d
719, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1989) (noting that personal jurisdiction over defendant
does not necessarily mean forum is convenient); McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc.,
693 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) (affirming district court'sforum non conveniens
dismissal of wrongful death action brought by Texas residents against California cor-
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Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas Wrongful Death
Statute (the "Texas Statute")' precludes aforum non conveniens
dismissal in cases arising under the statute.65
3. Forum Non Conveniens in Other States
The majority of state courts, as well as federal courts, cur-
rently utilize the doctrine offorum non conveniens.66 Thirty-three
states recognize the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.67 Two states have incorporated the doctrine into a
procedural rule.6" Six states have adopted the doctrine by stat-
ute.69 Additionally, nine states have either rejected the doc-
trine or have not addressed its applicability as a ground for
dismissal.7 °
In the federal courts, the most dramatic recent use of the
doctrine occurred in the litigation stemming from the Union
Carbide gas leak in Bhopal, India.7 1 In that case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of
the litigation.72 The court declared that India was a more con-
venient forum. 7' The dismissal produced a flood of legal com-
poration concerning plane crash in Colorado in which Colorado citizen died); Ismail
v. Ismail, 702 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) (holding that court should retain
jurisdiction in divorce case between two Egyptian citizens where parties owned prop-
erty in Texas and Texan law applied), writ ref'd. The author found only three Texas
cases usingforum non conveniens after 1979.
64. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
65. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 671 (1991); see In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4779 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 1991) (holding that Warsaw Convention preempts
state wrongful death actions when claim falls under scope of Convention regarding
international transportation).
66. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing status of forum non
conveniens in federal and state courts).
67. See supra note 9 (listing states applying common lawforum n6n conveniens).
68. See IND. R. TRIAL PROC. 4.4(c) (1971); N.D. R. CIv. PROC. 4(b)(5) (1983).
69. See supra note 8 (listing state forum non conveniens statutes).
70. See supra note 10 (listing states that do not useforum non conveniens).
71. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
72. Id. at 202.
73. Id.; see In re Union Carbide Corp., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 921 (2d Cir. Feb.
25, 1991) (holding thatforum non conveniens dismissal does not preclude subsequent
exercise by district court of ancillary jurisdiction to consider fee applications by
plaintiffs' attorneys). The court noted, however, that the trial court has discretion to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction based on judicial economy, convenience, and fairness
to litigants. Id.
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mentary, much of it negative.7 4 The doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, in both state and federal courts, thus remains a contro-
versial one.7 5
B. Specific Jurisdiction Statutes and Forum Non Conveniens
1. Specific Jurisdiction Statutes and Specific Venue Statutes
Before a court can dismiss a case on the ground of forum
non conveniens, it must possess jurisdiction and it must be the
proper venue for the case.7 6 Jurisdiction over the defendant
must conform to the requirements of the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution." In
74. See McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J.
333 (1985); Nanda, For Whom the Bell Tolls in the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflec-
tions on Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15
DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 235 (1987); Note, An Economic Approach to Forum Non Con-
veniens Dismissals Requested by U.S. Multinational Corporations-The Bhopal Case, 22 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 215 (1988); Note, The Bhopal Incident: How the Courts Have
Faced Complex International Litigation, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 445 (1987); Note, International
Mass Tort Litigation: Forum Non Conveniens and the Adequate Alternative Forum in Light of
the Bhopal Disaster, 16 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109 (1986); Note, The Razor's Edge: The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the Union Carbide Methyl Isocynate Gas Disaster at
Bhopal, India, 10 N.C.J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 743 (1985).
75. See Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 1259 (1986).
76. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947); see supra notes 21-24
(discussing prerequisites to forum non conveniens analysis); cf. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363
U.S. 335 (1960) (holding that court can transfer action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404
only to court where jurisdiction and venue are proper).
77. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); see International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to ajudgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
Due process also requires that the court give adequate notice of the suit to the
defendant. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950). Moreover, the court must have authority to rule upon the subject matter of
the litigation. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. The U.S. Congress under the guidance of the
U.S. Constitution determines the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (setting forth general sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts); id. § 1367 (setting forth supplemen-
tal jurisdiction of federal district courts); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra note 7, at 13 (summarizing federal subject matter jurisdiction). State
constitutions and legislatures determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the state
courts. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (setting forth general subject matter jurisdiction
of Texas state district courts).
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determining such conformity, a court must analyze whether
the defendant's contacts with the forum state warrant a finding
of jurisdiction. 8 In analyzing these contacts, the court should
consider factors of fairness and reasonableness. 9 Some U.S.
statutes provide nationwide service of process for specific
causes of action, thus achieving personal jurisdiction over de-
fendants in actions that comply with the statute.80 Some states
possess general service statutes that provide for personal juris-
diction in state courts under circumstances co-terminous with
due process jurisdiction."' Most states provide for personal ju-
risdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if the defendant
falls within the specific terms of the statute that constitute ad-
ditional limitations on personal jurisdiction more stringent
than the constitutional limits.
8 2
Some statutes confer subject matter jurisdiction, in addi-
78. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). In
the minimum contacts analysis, the Supreme Court has concentrated on the notion of
foreseeability. Id. at 291. The Court stated that "[tihe defendant's conduct and con-
nection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there." Id. at 297.
79. Id. at 292. The U.S. Supreme Court enumerated these factors. Id. The suit
should comply with notions of fairness and justice. Id. The forum should be reason-
able. Id. The court should consider the forum state's interest in the litigation. Id.
Moreover, the court should consider the plaintiff's convenience and need for effec-
tive relief. Id. Furthermore, the court should look to an efficient resolution of the
litigation. Id. Finally, the court may consider the fundamental social policy interest
of the several states. Id. In his dissent, Justice Brennan advocated greater considera-
tion of the fairness and reasonableness factors, including the actual inconvenience to
the defendant. Id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court later gave even greater weight to these fairness and justice
factors. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi,
the weight of these factors was enough for the Court to find a lack of personal juris-
diction, despite the presence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the
forum. Id. at 114-16.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1988) (empowering members of Securities and Ex-
change Commission to compel attendance of witnesses and production of records
throughout United States); id. § 1312(d)(1) (granting nationwide jurisdiction in anti-
trust actions); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1988) (allowing RICO actions to be instituted in any
U.S. district court in which defendant resides, is found, has agent, or transacts af-
fairs).
81. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 413.10 & 415.40 (West 1973) (providing for
service of summons on parties outside California); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33 (1985)
(providing for long-arm jurisdiction not contrary to U.S. Constitution).
82. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041, 17.042, 17.043, 17.044 &
17.045 (conveying personal jurisdiction in tort actions where non-resident defendant
does business in Texas). The statute considers the defendant's activity as doing busi-
ness
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tion to venue, on courts.8 3 Specific subject matter jurisdiction
statutes empower courts to hear particular causes of action. 4
Specific venue statutes enumerate the districts or courts in
which a plaintiff may bring a specific cause of action.85 Even
if the nonresident:
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either
party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state;
(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or
(3) recruits Texas residents directly or through an intermediary located
in this state, for employment inside or outside the state.
Id. § 17.042. Known as "long-arm" statutes, such statutes create "long-arm" juris-
diction. Id.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). General subject matter jurisdiction statutes
confer jurisdiction over a wide range of causes of action. See id. § 1332(a) (conferring
general subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts over actions involving
diversity of citizenship).
To determine if venue is proper, the court must look to the appropriate venue
statute that states that
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only in diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1)
a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which
the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only [in]
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in
the same State, (2) ajudicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of prop-
erty that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in
which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought.
Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 311, 104 Stat. 5114 (1990).
The Texas general venue statute states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
this subchapter ... all lawsuits shall be brought in the county in which all or part of
the cause of action accrued or in the county of the defendant's residence if defendant
is a natural person." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon 1986).
84. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). The pertinent part of FELA states that
"[u]nder this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United
States." Id. § 56. The Texas Wrongful Death Statute states that "[a]n action for
damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state, of the United
States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this state." TEX. CiV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a) (Vernon 1986).
85. See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1988). FELA states that "[u]nder this chapter an action
may be brought ... in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing such action." Id.; see 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988) (codifying Jones Act)
(granting cause of action for damages at law to seamen who suffer personal injury in
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though some of these statutes may authorize both jurisdiction
and venue, the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the
defendant's contacts with the forum state must still satisfy the
requirement of due process.86
The U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally considered
questions of case dismissals brought under specific subject
matter jurisdiction or venue statutes.87 In many instances,
course of employment). TheJones Act states that "U]urisdiction in such actions shall
be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which
his principal office is located." Id.
86. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (1961). In Gray, the Illinois Supreme Court decided
whether a state long-arm statute violated due process of law. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d
at 762. The long-arm statute provided that a non-resident who commits a tortious
act within the state submits to jurisdiction of the state court. Id. The analysis regard-
ing a long-arm statute thus becomes whether the defendant submits to jurisdiction
under the statute and whether such jurisdiction violates due process. Id.; see Hi Fash-
ion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising, Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 583, 300 N.E.2d 421,
347 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1973) (noting that purpose of New York long-arm statute was to
extend jurisdiction of New York courts to nonresidents who have engaged in pur-
poseful activity in relation to matter of suit and that single transaction complies with
statute).
87. See, e.g., Douglas v. New York, N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377
(1929) (upholding state court's dismissal of case brought under specific jurisdiction
and venue statute). In another FELA action twelve years later, the Court held that a
district court could not dismiss an action appropriately brought under a specific
venue statute. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
In Kepner, the defendant, a citizen of Ohio and employee of the plaintiff, brought
an action under FELA against the plaintiff in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Id. at 48. The plaintiff, an interstate railroad, was doing busi-
ness in that district. Id. The defendant sustained injury in Ohio. Id. The plaintiff
sought an injunction in Ohio state court to bar the defendant's suit in the Eastern
District of New York. Id. The Ohio trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action. Id.
Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
an employee had a right under FELA to bring an action. Id. at 48-49. The U.S.
Supreme Court confirmed that "[a] privilege of venue, granted by the legislative
body which created this right of action, cannot be frustrated for reasons of conven-
ience or expense. If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative." Id. at 54.
In 1947, however, when the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, it upheld the use offorum non conveniens in cases where a general venue
statute conveyed jurisdiction. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
Subsequently, in a slight retreat from Kepner, the Court permitted a Missouri state
court to apply theforum non conveniens doctrine to a FELA action. Missouri ex rel. S.
Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950). In his opinionJustice Frankfurter, who wrote
the dissenting opinion in Kepner, claimed that Kepner did not limit
the power of a State to deny access to its courts to persons seeking recovery
under the [FELA] if in similar cases the State for reasons of local policy
denies resort to its courts and enforces its policy impartially ... so as not to
involve a discrimination against [FELA] suits and not to offend against the
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these statutes conflict with the doctrine of forum non conveniens
because the doctrine appears to override the intent of the stat-
utes to confer jurisdiction. 8 As a result of these decisions, the
interaction amongforum non conveniens, specific subject matter
jurisdiction statutes, and specific venue statutes remains un-
resolved .89
2. The Texas Wrongful Death Statute and Forum Non
Conveniens
Like the federal courts, the Texas courts have struggled
with the issue of whether a specific subject matter jurisdiction
statute or a long arm statute precludes a forum non conveniens
dismissal.90 A conflict developed over time betweenforum non
Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of the Constitution. No such restriction is
imposed upon the States merely because the Employers' Liability Act em-
powers their courts to entertain suits arising under it.
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Unlike the action in Mayfield, the FELA action in Kepner
originated in a federal, not state, court. Kepner, 314 U.S. at 48. FELA directly confers
subject matter jurisdiction and venue on specific federal, not state, courts. 45 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1988); see supra note 2 (containing text of FELA statute). The Mayfield Court
thus did not overrule its prior ruling that a district court could not dismiss a FELA
action. See Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 4. In addition, between the Kepner and Mayfield deci-
sions, Congress enacted the change of venue statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
Section 1404 permits a federal court to transfer certain cases. Id. In his concurring
opinion in Mayfield, Justice Jackson noted that "[c]ertainly a State is under no obliga-
tion to provide a court for two nonresident parties to litigate a foreign-born cause of
action when the Federal Government, which creates the cause of action, frees its own
courts within that State from mandatory consideration of the same case." Mayfield,
340 U.S. at 6 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Montana and Georgia have declined to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens
in FELA cases. Brown v. Seaboard Coast Lines R.R. Co., 229 Ga. 481, 192 S.E.2d
382, 383 (1972); Labella v. Burlington N. Inc., 182 Mont. 202, 595 P.2d 1184, 1187
(1979).
88. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing statutes conferring
subject matter jurisdiction).
89. See, e.g., Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1990)
(noting that U.S. Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit maintains federal defense offorum
non conveniens in Jones Act cases, overriding Louisiana law that does not recognize
forum non conveniens); Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that special venue provisions of Clayton Act supplement rather than pre-
empt general venue statutes), injunction pending appeal denied sub nom., Go-Video, Inc.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991); Brown v. Seaboard Coast Lines
R.R. Co., 229 Ga. 481, 192 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1972) (holding that FELA does not
permitforum non conveniens defense).
90. See Allen v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), writ ref'd; Flaiz v.
Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962); Couch v. Chevron Int'l Co., 682 S.W.2d 534
(Tex. 1984) (per curiam); McNutt v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1985) (all dealing with Texas Statute); see also Corliss v. Smith, 560 S.W.2d 166
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conveniens and the Texas Wrongful Death Statute (the "Texas
Statute") that grants specific subject matter jurisdiction.9 The
Texas legislature enacted the predecessor of the current Texas
Statute in 1913 (the "Act of 1913").92 The Act of 1913 con-
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (declining to assert jurisdiction even though plaintiffs' case
satisfied requirements of specific jurisdiction statute of family law code); Van Winkle-
Hooker Co. v. Rice, 448 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (holding that forum non
conveniens dismissal violates public policy of "long-arm" personal jurisdiction statute).
91. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986). The Texas
Statute currently states that
(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen
of this state, of the United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in
the courts of this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or default caus-
ing the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right
to maintain an action for damages for the death or injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the
laws of this state for beginning the action; and
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has
equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.
(b) All matters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or mainte-
nance of the action in the courts of this state are governed by the law of this
state.
(c) The court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are appropri-
ate under the facts of the case.
Id.; see Allen, 47 S.W.2d 426; Flaiz, 359 S.W.2d 872; Couch, 682 S.W.2d 534; McNutt,
693 S.W.2d 666.
92. Act of April 8, 1913, ch. 161 § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 338 [hereinafter Act
of 1913]. The wording of the text is as follows:
An Act for the protection of persons of this State who may be injured in a
foreign country and providing for adequate compensation therefor, and de-
claring an emergency.
SECTION 1. That whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of
this State or of a country having equal treaty rights with the United States on
behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default in any State, for which a right to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof is given by a statute or by law of such State,
territory or foreign country, such right of action may be enforced in the
courts of the United States, or in the courts of this State, within the time
prescribed for the commencement of such action by the statute of this State,
and the law of the former shall control in the maintenance of such action in
all matters pertaing [pertaining] [sic] to procedure.
SEC. 2. The fact that there is now no law permitting citizens of this
State who receive injuries in a foreign country from bringing an action for
said injuries under the laws of this State, creates an emergency and impera-
tive public necessity requiring that the constitutional rule that bills shall be
read upon three several days, should be suspended and it is hereby sus-
pended, and this Act shall take effect from and after its passage.
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ferred a right to bring actions in Texas courts for wrongful
death or personal injury on citizens of Texas or foreign coun-
tries having equal treaty rights with the United States.93 In
1917, the Texas legislature amended the Act of 1913 to in-
clude actions brought by citizens of other U.S. states (the "Act
of 1917"). 4
Under the Act of 1917, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
in Allen v. Bass 95 held that a New Mexican plaintiff had an abso-
lute right to bring his personal injury case in a Texas court and
that the trial court had no discretion to dismiss the action.96
The Allen court viewed the Act of 1913 and the Act of 1917 as
conveying compulsory jurisdiction over certain wrongful death
or personal injury actions.97 The legislature has amended the
93. Id.
94. Act of March 30, 1917, ch. 156, § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 365 [hereinafter
Act of 1917]. The amended text read as follows:
An Act for the protection of citizens of this State and of the United States,
and citizens of countries having equal treaty rights with the United States on
behalf of their citizens, who may be killed or injured in a foreign state or
country, and providing for the procedure of trying such suits and causes of
action in the courts of the State of Texas, and providing compensation
therefor, and declaring an emergency.
SEC. 1. That whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this
State or of the United States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty
rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any such foreign
state or country for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages
thereof is given by the statute or law of such foreign state or country, such
right of action may be enforced in the courts of this State within the time
prescribed for the commencement of such actions by the statute of this
State, and the law of the forum shall control in the prosecution and mainte-
nance of such action in the courts of this State in all matters pertaining to
the procedure.
SEC. 2. The fact that there is now no law permitting citizens of this
State, or of a foreign state or country, who may be killed or injured in a
foreign state or country, for bringing an action for such injury or death
under the laws of this State and in the courts of this State, creates an emer-
gency and imperative public necessity ....
Id.
95. 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), writ ref'd.
96. Id. at 427. The Allen case involved a vehicular accident. Id. The plaintiff was
a citizen of New Mexico. Id. The defendant driver was also from New Mexico, while
the defendant insurer of the driver did business and maintained offices in both Texas
and New Mexico. Id.
97. Id. In 1947, a legal commentator listed Texas as one of the states that did
not recognize the doctrine offorum non conveniens, citing Allen for support. Barrett,
supra note 13, at 388 n.40.
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Texas Statute since Allen.98 Until 1990, however, neither the
legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether the Texas Statute precluded a forum non conveniens
dismissal.99
II. THE CASTRO ALFARO DECISION
In Castro Alfaro, an international tort case, the Supreme
Court of Texas concluded that a specific subject matter juris-
diction statute, the Texas Statute, precludes a forum non con-
veniens dismissal.' 0 The Texas Supreme Court thereby abol-
ished forum non conveniens in cases brought under the Texas
Statute.'' This decision has removed a major barrier to inter-
national tort litigation in Texas.10 2
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Castro Alfaro, Costa Rican farm workers brought an ac-
tion in Texas state court alleging injuries from the use of a
98. See Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 530 § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381, 1382
[hereinafter Act of 1975]. The new language states that "[aIll matters pertaining to
procedure in the prosecution or maintenance of such action in the courts of this State
shall be governed by the law of this State, and the court shall apply such rules of
substantive law as are appropriate under the facts of the case." Id. This amendment
resolved the problems of the ex loci delicti principle and the dissimilarity doctrine. See
id.; supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing lex loci delicti and dissimilarity).
The current codification of the Texas Statute took effect on September 1, 1985. See
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986); supra note 91 (setting
forth text of Texas Statute).
99. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Tex. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991); Couch v. Chevron Int'l Co., 682 S.W.2d 534
(1984). The court in Couch did not reach the issue of forum non conveniens but dis-
missed the case because the plaintiffs waived the wrongful death cause of action by
not pleading it until appeal. Id. at 535. The court, however, did note that "the appli-
cability of forum non conveniens to a [wrongful death] cause of action is an open ques-
tion." Id. at 535; Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962). In Flaiz, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's opinion that dismissed a personal injury
action because South Dakota law would have applied. Id. at 873. The Flaiz court
refrained from deciding the extent offorum non conveniens in Texas, and whether the
Texas Statute precluded a forum non conveniens dismissal. Id. at 874. Subsequently,
the fifth appellate district in Texas found that the Texas Statute was permissive, not
mandatory, in regard to a court's exercise of jurisdiction. See McNutt v. Teledyne
Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985).
100. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679. Castro Alfaro involved the Texas Statute
giving a right to foreign plaintiffs to bring a wrongful death action in Texas. Id. at
675; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
101. See Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679.
102. Id. at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
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pesticide.' 3 Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") and Shell Oil
Company ("Shell"), U.S. corporations, both manufactured the
pesticide.'1 4 Shell's world headquarters are located in Hous-
ton, Texas.' 5 Dow maintains its headquarters in Michigan but
conducts much of its business through its Houston office and
operates its largest chemical plant in Texas.'o6
The defendants contested the jurisdiction of the trial court
and argued, in the alternative, for a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal.' 0 7 The trial court found jurisdiction under the Texas Stat-
ute but summarily granted theforum non conveniens dismissal.'° 8
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the Texas Statute abolished the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in cases brought under the Texas Statute.' 0 9 The
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate
court in a five to four decision.'' 0
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Ray, rested upon
three basic premises."' The first premise of the majority opin-
ion maintained that the Act of 1913 may have superseded the
103. Id. at 675. The plaintiffs' employer, Standard Fruit Company, a U.S. cor-
poration, purchased the pesticide, dibromochloropropane ("DBCP") from Dow
Chemical Company ("Dow"). Id.
104. Id. Dow shipped DBCP to Costa Rica after the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency banned domestic use of DBCP in 1977. Id. at 681 (Doggett, J., concur-
ring).
105. Id. In fact, Shell's headquarters are located three blocks from the court-
house where the Castro Alfaro case was filed. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 675. The defendants made this motion almost three years after the
filing of the suit. Id. Prior to this motion, Dow and Shell attempted unsuccessfully to
remove the suit to federal district court. Id. Justice Doggett, in his concurrence,
noted that no clear basis existed for federal jurisdiction and that the federal district
court, "in remanding the case, labelled Shell and Dow's efforts to distinguish plainly
controlling authority against removal 'specious.' " Id. at 682 n.4 (Doggett,J., concur-
ring).
108. Id. Justice Hecht noted in his dissent that "[t]he trial court in the present
case did not provide this essential basis [the reasons and factors it considered in
dismissing the case] for its decision to dismiss this case." Id. at 708 (Hecht, J., dis-
senting).
109. Castro Alfaro v. Dow Chem. Co., 751 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App. 1988), aff'd,
786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 671 (1991).
110. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied,
I llS. Ct. 671 (1991).
111. Id. at 674-79.
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doctrine offorum non conveniens in wrongful death cases.'12 Re-
lying on Texas case law and commentaries, Justice Ray con-
cluded that the doctrine existed prior to the Act of 1913.13
The majority found that Texas courts, as well as U.S. federal
courts, applied the doctrine offorum non conveniens in principle,
if not by name, prior to 1913." The majority concluded that
becauseforum non conveniens existed in Texas prior to 1913, the
legislature thus could have abolishedforum non conveniens by the
Act of 1913."
The second rationale of the majority opinion stated that'
the Texas Statute confers compulsory jurisdiction on Texas
courts."t 6 In reaching this conclusion, the majority focused on
the Texas Statute's wording that an action may be enforced." 17
The court interpreted this wording as mandatory rather than
permissive." 8 Thus, the court concluded that the Texas Stat-
ute's wording barred a forum non conveniens dismissal."'
Finally, the court recognized the Allen decision as valid
pyecedent.120  The majority noted that, in Allen, the Texas
112. Id. at 676.
113. Id. at 676-77. The majority relied on several cases and commentators. Id.;
see Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd.,
285 U.S. 413 (1932); Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S.
515 (1930); Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896);
Morris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 17, 14 S.W. 228 (1890); Missouri, Kan. and
Tex. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Godair Comm. Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 298, 87 S.W. 871, 872
(1905); Southern Pac. Co. v. Graham, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 34 S.W. 135 (1896);
Blair, supra note 12; Barrett, supra note 13.
The majority noted that "although Justice Gonzalez is correct that the first re-
ported case using the term 'forum non conveniens' is Garrett v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
the doctrine itself was effectively established in Texas before the enactment of article
4678 [the Texas Statute] by the legislature in 1913." Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 677
(citation omitted).
114. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 677; see supra note 113 (containing cases relied
on by Castro Alfaro court).
115. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679.
116. Id. at 674.
117. Id. at 675. For text of the Texas Statute, see supra note 91.
118. See id. at 679-80 (Hightower, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 679.
120. Id. at 678; see Allen v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), writ ref'd
(Tex.). Allen held that the Texas Statute prevented Texas courts from declining juris-
diction of cases arising under the Texas Statute. Id. Justice Ray located the court's
approval of Allen in its refusal to hear the Allen defendant's appeal. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991); see
supra note 96 (discussing facts of Allen).
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Court of Civil Appeals held that the Texas Statute gave a plain-
tiff an absolute right to maintain an action under the Texas
Statute. 2 ' The Texas Supreme Court subsequently denied
the defendant's Writ of Error. 22 The Castro Alfaro court inter-
preted this rejection as a manifestation of the Texas Supreme
Court's tacit approval of the Allen decision.' 23 Based on this
terse interpretation of the Texas Statute and Allen, the Castro
Alfaro court concluded that the Texas Statute abolished the
doctrine of forum non conveniens as a defense in wrongful death
actions brought under the Texas Statute. 2
4
C. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Hightower and Doggett each filed separate con-
curring opinions. 2 5 The two concurring opinions diverged
from the majority opinion and from each other. 26 Justice
Hightower, in his concurrence, supported the majority's inter-
121. Castro Alfaro, 674 S.W.2d at 678-79. The majority quoted the Allen holding
that "article 4678 [the Texas Statute] opens the courts of this state to citizens of a
neighboring state and gives to them an absolute right to maintain a transitory action of
the present nature and to try their cases in the courts of this state." Id. at 678 (quot-
ing Allen, 47 S.W.2d at 427) (emphasis in original).
122. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679. A writ of error is a
writ issued from a court of appellate jurisdiction, directed to the judge or
judges of a court of record, requiring them to remit to the appellate court
the record of an action before them, in which a final judgment has been
entered, in order that examination may be made of certain errors alleged to
have been committed, and that the judgment may be reversed, corrected, or
affirmed, as the case may require. It is brought for supposed error in law
apparent on record and takes case to higher tribunal, which affirms or
reverses. It is commencement of new suit to set aside judgment, and is not
continuation of suit to which it relates.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1610 (6th ed. 1990). In Texas, a litigant appeals an appel-
late court decision by filing an application for a writ of error to the Supreme Court.
See TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 22.001, 22.007 (Vernon 1986).
123. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679. The court noted that the petitioner in
Allen made an argument for the application offorum non conveniens similar to the argu-
ments defendants made for its application in Castro Alfaro. Id. at 678. The Texas
legislature, however, has distinctly stated that "[t]he refusal or dismissal of an appli-
cation [for writ of error] shall not be regarded as a precedent or authority." TEx.
Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.007 (Vernon 1986).
124. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). The majority stated that "the legislature has statut~rily
abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits brought under section
71.031 [the Texas Statute]." Id.
125. Id. at 679 (Hightower, J., concurring); id. at 680 (Doggett, J., concurring).
126. Compare id. at 679 (Hightower, J., concurring) with id. at 680 (Doggett, J.,
concurring).
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pretation of the Texas Statute but recommended a change in
the statute to accommodate aforum non conveniens dismissal.'27
Justice Doggett, however, supported the majority decision but
expanded upon it, addressing issues raised by the dissent and
generally criticizing the doctrine of forum non conveniens.128
Justice Hightower agreed that the legislature's enactment
of the Texas Statute abolishedforum non conveniens.'29 In sup-
port of this conclusion, Justice Hightower found the wording
of the Texas Statute to be mandatory rather than permis-
sive.130 Nevertheless, Justice Hightower supported the codifi-
cation of forum non conveniens as a procedural aid,13 1 and urged
the legislature to clarify its intent in regard to the Texas Stat-
ute. 13
2
Justice Doggett's concurrence reinforced the majority
opinion.'"3 He relied on Allen to state that the Act of 1913
abolished forum non conveniens in wrongful death actions in
Texas.' 4 Justice Doggett, however, then engaged in a broad
discussion of forum non conveniens. I3 5
Justice Doggett's opinion criticized the doctrine of forum
non conveniens on grounds of international public policy and
justice.' 6 Justice Doggett noted that a forum non conveniens dis-
127. Id. at 679-80 (Hightower, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 680-89 (Doggett, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 679 (Hightower, J., concurring). Justice Hightower noted that "the
Texas legislature statutorily abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens when it
enacted the predecessors of section 71.031." Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Justice Hightower stated that the doctrine is "a useful tool of judicial
administration," but "the wording of section 71.031 is clear and we must respect
what the legislature has done." Id. at 679 & 680 (Hightower, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 680 (Hightower, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 680 (Doggett, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 682 (Doggett, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 680-89 (Doggett,J., concurring). Justice Doggett remarked that "the
'doctrine' ... has nothing to do with fairness and convenience and everything to do
with immunizing multinational corporations from accountability for their alleged
torts causing injury abroad." Id. at 680-81 (Doggett, J., concurring).
136. Id. Justice Doggett's recitation of the facts of the case stressed the domi-
nant U.S. activity of the tort in question, highlighting the tendency of the forum non
conveniens doctrine to shield international corporations from accountability for such
conduct. Id. Justice Doggett noted that
[t]he banana plantation workers allegedly injured by DBCP were employed
by an American company on American-owned land and grew Dole bananas
for export solely to American tables. The chemical allegedly rendering the
workers sterile was researched, formulated, tested, manufactured, labelled
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missal is often outcome determinative. 13 7 Thus, a forum non
conveniens dismissal often results in defeat for the plaintiff be-
cause litigation in the alternative forum is impossible or im-
practical. 38 In addition, Justice Doggett noted that the appli-
cation of the private interest factors set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Reyno and Gilbert tended to help defendants
obtain results contrary to international public policy rather
than fair and convenient results. 39
Moreover, Justice Doggett addressed the public interest
factors weighed in the forum non conveniens analysis. Justice
Doggett argued that a comprehensive and rigorously applied
due process analysis of personal jurisdiction adequately cov-
ered public concerns. 40 According to him, abolishing forum
non conveniens would not lead to a flood of litigation brought by
foreign plaintiffs because other U.S. states that do not employ
the doctrine do not show an increase in foreign litigation.' 4 '
and shipped by an American company in the United States to another Amer-
ican company. The decision to manufacture DBCP for distribution and use
in the third world was made by these two American companies in their cor-
porate offices in the United States.
Id. at 681 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Doggett later noted that "[b]oth as a
matter of law and of public policy, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is without
justification." Id. at 682 (Doggett, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 682-83 (Doggett, J., concurring).
138. Id.; see Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 91 (2d Cir.
1984); Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England. "A Rather Fantastic
Fiction", 103 L.Q R. 398, 409 (1987). Foreign courts may limit recovery either by
awarding inadequate compensation or by not recognizing certain causes of action.
See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
139. Castro Alfaro, 674 S.W.2d at 683 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Doggett
noted the intention of Texas venue law to afford defendants the privilege of a home
forum. Id. at 684 (Doggett, J., concurring). He further noted that "[a]dvances in
transportation and communications technology have rendered the private factors
largely irrelevant." Id.
140. Id. at 684-85 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Doggett attacked Justice
Cook's argument thatforum non conveniens fills the gaps in the constitutional analysis
ofjurisdiction. Id. He pointed out thatforum non conveniens cannot be examined until
jurisdiction is ascertained and that it should not be, as it often is, used by courts to
counteract an inadequate due process analysis. Id. at 685 n.8 (Doggett, J., concur-
ring). Justice Doggett also noted that Texas had a strong interest to adjudicate this
case in light of defendants' extensive operations in Texas. Id. at 686 (Doggett, J.,
concurring); see infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text (discussing due process
analysis of personal jurisdiction).
141. Id. at 686 (Doggett, J., concurring); seeJ. GOERDT, C. LOMVARDIAS, G. GAL-
LAS & B. MAHONEY, EXAMINING COURT DELAY-THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 26 URBAN
TRIAL COURTS, 1987, 20 & 22 (1989). Justice Doggett also noted that despite the
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Regarding judicial comity, 42 Justice Doggett argued that com-
ity would be best achieved by rejecting forum non conveniens,
thus protecting the citizens of the foreign forum.' 43 Noting
that the contemporary global market makesforum non conveniens
obsolete, Justice Doggett concluded that the demise of forum
non conveniens would provide a much-needed deterrent against
civil law violations by multinational corporations.144
D. The Dissenting Opinions
Four justices dissented in Castro Alfaro, revealing the depth
of the court's disagreement. 45 Chief Justice Phillips stated
that the Texas Statute does not preclude a forum non conveniens
dismissal. 46 Justice Gonzalez argued that the Texas Statute
did not abolishforum non conveniens. 147 Justice Cook found that
courts needforum non conveniens to supplement the personal ju-
risdiction due process analysis in achieving goals of fairness
and justice. 148  Finally, Justice Hecht considered the Texas
Texas Statute and its predecessors granting foreign citizens the right to sue, no flood
of foreign litigation has occurred in Texas. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786
S.W.2d 674, 686 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671
(1991). In addition, Justice Doggett noted that forum non conveniens itself increases
litigation. Id. at 687 (Doggett, J., concurring); see Robertson, supra note 138, at 414 &
426.
142. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing comity).
143. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 687 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Doggett
noted that "[c]omity is not achieved when the United States allows its multinational
corporations to adhere to a double standard when operating abroad and subse-
quently refuses to hold them accountable for those actions." Id.
144. Id. at 688-89 (Doggett, J., concurring); see Note, An Economic Approach to
Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 22 GEO. WASH. J. Ir'L L. & EcON. 235, 241 (1985).
Justice Doggett quoted the senior vice-president for environmental affairs at Mon-
santo who stated that "[t]he realization at corporate headquarters that liability for
any [industrial] disaster would be decided in the U.S. courts, more than pressure
from Third World governments, has forced companies to tighten safety procedures,
upgrade plants, supervise maintenance more closely and educate workers and com-
munities." Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 687 n.10; see Foreign Firms Feel the Impact of
Bhopal Most, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1985, § 1, at 22, col. 4.
145. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 689-708 (Tex. 1990)
(Phillips, C.J., Gonzalez, J., Cook, J., Hecht,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671
(1991).
146. Id. at 689 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting); see infra notes 150-52 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Chief Justice Phillips's dissent).
147. Castro A4lfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); see infra notes
153-63 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Gonzalez's dissent).
148. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 697-702 (Cook, J., dissenting); see infra notes
164-71 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Cook's dissent).
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Statute permissive in allowing wrongful death actions by for-
eign plaintiffs, labeled Allen an erroneous ruling, and deemed
forum non conveniens a necessary doctrine to protect courts from
exercising jurisdiction that would be unfair to the defendants
and the public.' 49
Chief Justice Phillips's dissent stated that the Texas Stat-
ute does not prohibit common law procedural defenses such as
forum non conveniens.'t 0 The Chief Justice would thus overrule
Allen.' ChiefJustice Phillips recommended that the Castro Al-
faro case be remanded for a fullforum non conveniens analysis. t52
Similarly, Justice Gonzalez disagreed with the majority's
argument that the legislature statutorily abolished forum non
conveniens."'5 He contended that forum non conveniens did not
appear in Texas until after the Acts of 1913 and 1917 and that
therefore- these Acts could not have abolished the doctrine.'1 4
In addition, Justice Gonzalez argued that, in enacting the
Texas Statute, the legislature sought to counteract the dissimi-
larity doctrine 55 rather than forum non conveniens.'56
149. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 702-08 (Hecht, J., dissenting); see infra notes
172-80 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Hecht's dissent).
150. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 689 (Tex. 1990) (Phil-
lips, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 671 (1991).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 690 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Phillips expressed "no
intimation as to whether or not the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be ap-
propriate under the facts of this particular case." d.
153. Id. at 691-93 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 691 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez questioned the
court's reliance on a commentator's article and on the commentator's conclusion of
the early use of forum non conveniens in state courts. d. at 692 (Gonzalez, J., dissent-
ing); see Blair, supra note 12; Stein, supra note 15, at 796 n.43. Justice Gonzalez simply
did not believe that the legislature was acquainted with the doctrine in order to abol-
ish it. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 692 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez
did not, however, discuss the cases cited by the majority in support of its conclusion
that Texas courts applied the doctrine in principle prior to 1913. Id.
155. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing dissimilarity doc-
trine).
156. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 693 (Tex. 1990) (Gonza-
lez, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). Justice Gonzalez maintained
that the legislature enacted the Texas Statute "to give Texas citizens the right to
maintain a cause of action in the courts of this State free from the threat of a dismis-
sal under the dissimilarity doctrine." Id. at 692 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (citing Act
of 1913); see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing dissimilarity doc-
trine). Justice Gonzalez pointed to the caption of the Texas Statute and subsection 2
to support his argument. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 692; see Act of April 8, 1913, ch.
161, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 338; supra note 92 (setting forth text of 1913 act).
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Additionally, Justice Gonzalez criticized the majority's reli-
ance on Allen.' 57 He noted that subsequent Texas Supreme
Court decisions held that the status of forum non conveniens
under the Texas Statute remained undetermined.15 8 In addi-
tion, Justice Gonzalez argued that the dismissal reversed by Al-
len was based on comity considerations rather than forum non
conveniens. 159 He also reasoned that the Allen decision granted
an absolute right to maintain an action only to citizens of other
states, not to foreign plaintiffs. 160
Justice Gonzalez feared that the Castro A4faro decision
would attract mass disaster lawsuits to Texas, overburdening
already overcrowded courts. 16 ' Rather than abolishforum non
conveniens, Justice Gonzalez would direct courts to utilize the
doctrine in a restricted manner.162 Justice Gonzalez concluded
by noting that the social policy changes advocated by Justice
Doggett require legislative, not judicial, action.1 63
Justice Cook analyzed theforum non conveniens issue in con-
nection with concerns relating to the due process analysis of
personal jurisdiction.' 6" He argued that abolishing forum non
conveniens would lead to assertions of jurisdiction violative of
157. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 693-95 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 694 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); see Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872
(Tex. 1962); Couch v. Chevron Int'l Co., 682 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam);
supra note 99 (discussing Flaiz and Couch).
159. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 694 (Gonzalez,J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez
argued that the Allen decision did not consider, let alone abolish,forum non conveniens.
Id.
160. Id. at 695 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez painted a negative
portrait of the plaintiffs as greedy forum shoppers, in contrast to Justice Doggett's
portrayal of the defendant corporations as avoiders of corporate accountability and
legal, as well as moral, duties. Id. at 690-91 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); id. at 680
(Doggett, J., concurring). In fact, other suits involving some of the same plaintiffs
and defendants were filed in both Florida and California and were dismissed on the
ground offorum non conveniens. Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985); Barrantes Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co.,
667 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 883 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir.
1989); Aguilar v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 86-4753 JGD, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12,
1986).
162. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 690 (Tex. 1990) (Gonza-
lez, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 671 (1991). Justice Gonzalez "would pro-
vide guidelines and set parameters for its use." Id.
163. Id. at 697 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 697-702 (Cook, J., dissenting).
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due process.1 65 Justice Cook observed that even if a court has
personal jurisdiction verified by a due process analysis, 166 that
analysis might not take into consideration all of the defend-
ant's interests, leaving a gap to be filled by a forum non con-
veniens analysis.' 67 In applying the current due process analy-
sis, including an evaluation of fairness factors, Justice Cook ar-
gued that a court may exercise jurisdiction that is
constitutional, yet unfair and unreasonable because it results in
inconvenience to the defendant. 68
Justice Cook found additional problems with the major-
ity's opinion. He argued that extending U.S. law beyond its
borders violates comity.' 69 Additionally, Justice Cook noted
that the possible application of Costa Rican law to the Castro
Alfaro case would weaken Texas interest in the litigation.' Fi-
nally, Justice Cook argued that by abolishing forum non con-
veniens, the court was opening the state courts to plaintiffs with
little relationship to the state.' 7'
Justice Hecht found the language of the Texas Statute
plainly permissive and the reasoning of Allen flawed. 17 He
contended that the Texas Statute simply prohibits dismissing
an action on the sole ground that plaintiffs are foreigners, or
because the cause of action arises in another state or coun-
165. Id. at 697 (Cook, J., dissenting).
166. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing personal jurisdic-
tion).
167. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 699 (Tex. 1990) (Cook,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 671 (1991). Justice Cook noted that after Gulf
Oil Corporation v. Gilbert and International Shoe, "[f]orum non conveniens, although not
explicitly dealt with in the jurisdictional analysis, was still the bridge that transversed
the gap between constitutional doctrines of jurisdiction and problems arising from
inconvenient forums." Id.
168. Id. at 701-02 (Cook,J., dissenting); see supra notes 18-32 and accompanying
text (discussing factors of inconvenience in utilizing doctrine of forum non conveniens).
169. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 701 (Cook, J., dissenting). Justice Cook asked
"[s]hould we not stop to consider . . . the possible effects of extending our laws
beyond the shores of the United States?" Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 704-06 (Hecht, J., dissenting). Justice Hecht noted that in dealing
with a statute similar to the one at issue in Castro Alfaro, the Alabama "legislature
chose to change its law to ensure recognition of the rule of forum non conveniens
[and] changed 'shall be enforceable' to 'may be enforceable'. The Texas Legisla-
ture's use of 'may' in the same context is no less permissive and no more
mandatory." Id. at 705 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
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try.' 73 Justice Hecht admitted that the Texas Statute is unclear
and found no adequate rationale in Allen to resolve the ambi-
guity. 174 Justice Hecht viewed Allen as an aberration of juris-
prudence that the court should overrule. 175
Justice Hecht's opinion concluded by urging the courts to
recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens.'76 According to
Justice Hecht, forum non conveniens protected the citizens of
Texas from facing greater liability at home than they would
face abroad for alleged wrongs committed abroad.17 7 In addi-
tion, Justice Hecht argued that the absence of forum non con-
veniens in Texas would discourage businesses from operating in
Texas. t 78 Justice Hecht also contended that forum non con-
veniens keeps courts free from litigation that has no relation to
the state.' 79 Finally, Justice Hecht agreed with Justice Cook
that forum non conveniens currently fills in gaps in the due pro-
cess analysis of personal jurisdiction, even though the private
interest factors of theforum non conveniens analysis are less cru-
cial today in view of current transportation and communication
technology. 8 0
The majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and four
173. Id. at 704 (Hecht, J., dissenting). Justice Hecht noted that other state
supreme courts have interpreted similar wording as permissive. Id. at 705 (Hecht, J.,
dissenting) (citing Silversmith v. Kenosha Auto Transp., 301 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Iowa
1981) (finding "may be brought" to be permissive); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Phillips, 286
Ala. 365, 240 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1970) (finding "shall be enforceable" to be
mandatory); Gonzalez v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 189 Kan. 689, 371 P.2d
193 (Kan. 1962) (finding "may be sued" to be permissive)). Justice Hecht also noted
that the Alabama legislature amended the wording of its statute to "may be enforcea-
ble" to authorize the rule of forum non conveniens. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro,
786 S.W.2d 674, 705 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht,J., dissenting) (citing ALA. CODE § 6-5-430
(1987)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
174. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 705 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 706 (Hecht,J., dissenting). Justice Hecht suggested that the case had
never been followed by another court, that several cases expressly rejected it, and
that several cases disapproved Allen "without even bothering to cite it." Id.; see Couch
v. Chevron Int'l Co., Inc., 682 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); Flaiz v. Moore,
359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962); McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1985); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 341 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960), writ dismissed.
176. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 706-08 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 706 n.10 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 707 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. Justice Hecht conceded that "[the relative importance of private fac-
tors as compared with public factors may have shifted since Gulf Oil. Ease of travel
and communication, availability of evidence by videotape and facsimile transmission,
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dissenting opinions presented a limited number of issues, de-
spite their differing views. The key issues remain the interpre-
tation of the Texas Statute vis-d-vis forum non conveniens dismis-
sals, the adequacy of forum non conveniens in achieving fairness
and convenience to all parties to the litigation,1 81 and the very
necessity of the doctrine at all.' 82 The Texas Supreme Court
addressed the first issue by holding that the Texas Statute pre-
cludesforum non conveniens dismissals. The other issues regard-
ingforum non conveniens, however, remain unresolved. 83
III. DOW CHEMICAL CO. V. CASTRO ALFARO: A GOOD
DECISION FOR INTERNATIONAL TORT
LITIGATION
The diversity of opinion in this case, the contention be-
tween members of the Texas Supreme Court, and the impas-
sioned rhetoric of some parts of the opinion reveal a contro-
versial legal issue. 184 Nevertheless, the majority's decision is
sound.' 85 The majority opinion constitutes valid statutory in-
terpretation, and the concurring opinion of Justice Doggett
presents a strong jurisdictional analysis and cogent interna-
tional policy arguments. 86
A. The Court's Interpretation of the Wrongful Death Statute Is
Proper
The Texas Supreme Court correctly interpreted the Texas
Statute as conferring compulsory jurisdiction on Texas
courts. 1 87 Similarly, its use of Allen as precedent for its inter-
pretation rests on valid grounds.'8 8 Moreover, the dissenting
and other technological advances have reduced the significance of some private in-
convenience factors." Id. at 708 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 680 (Doggett, J., concurring); id. at 706-08 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 689 (Doggett, J., concurring); id. at 706-08 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
183. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex. 1990)
(Hightower, J., concurring), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 671 (1991); id. at 680 & 689 (Dog-
gett, J., concurring); id. at 706-08 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
184. See supra notes 181 & 182 (discussing unresolved issues).
185. See infra notes 187-214 and accompanying text (discussing majority opin-
ion).
186. See infra notes 190-203 (discussing interpretation of Texas Statute); infra
notes 215-70 (discussing jurisdiction and international policy).
187. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text (discussing language and
purpose of Texas Statute).
188. See infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text (discussing Allen).
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arguments regarding the interpretation of the Texas Statute
and Allen are flawed.18 9
The wording and purpose of the Texas Statute support
the court's finding that the Texas Statute conveys an absolute
right on the plaintiff to bring a case in a Texas court.' 90 The
Texas Statute states that a wrongful death or personal injury
action may be enforced in Texas state courts, even if the tort or
injury took place in a foreign country, if three conditions are
met. '9 First, the law of Texas or the place where the injury
occurred must recognize the cause of action. 192 Second, the
plaintiff must bring the action in Texas within the period set by
the Texas statute of limitations. 93 Third, if the plaintiff is a
foreign citizen, the plaintiff's country must have equal treaty
rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.' 94 In ad-
dition, Texas law governs all matters of procedure relating to
the case.' 95 Finally, the Texas Statute directs the court to ap-
ply the substantive law that is appropriate to the facts of the
case.' 96 The Castro Alfaro trial court found that the case met
the requirements of the Texas Statute because Texas recog-
nizes the personal injury cause of action, the plaintiffs brought
suit within the period set by the statute of limitations, and
Costa Rica and the United States have equal treaty rights on
behalf of their citizens. 97
In interpreting the Texas Statute in relationship to forum
non conveniens, the crucial words are that "an action ... may be
189. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text (discussing arguments set
forth by dissenting justices).
190. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex. 1990), cert.
denied, Il1 S. Ct. 671 (1991); supra note 91 (setting forth text of Texas Statute). In
statutory interpretation, one looks not just to the language of the statute but also to
the legislature's intention and the statute's history. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jacksonville
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 540 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1976). The Lewis court noted that in
interpreting statutory language, "[tihe prime object is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the rule or regulation. Although the word 'shall' is generally construed
to be mandatory, it may be and frequently is held to be directory." Id. at 310.
191. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a) (Vernon 1986); see supra
note 91 (containing text of the Texas Statute).
192. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a)(1) (Vernon 1986).
193. Id. § 71.031(a)(2).
194. Id. § 71.031(a)(3).
195. Id. § 71.031(b).
196. Id. § 71.031(c).
197. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 675 n.2 & 681 (Tex.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
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enforced in the courts of this state although the wrongful act
or injury takes place in a foreign state or country .... ,,98 One
can interpret "may be enforced" as mandatory rather than per-
missive. 99 U.S. courts have specifically stated that the inter-
pretation of "may" as mandatory or permissive depends on the
context in which it occurs.2 °0 In addition, the Texas Statute
198. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a) (Vernon 1986). For the
complete text of the Texas Statute, see supra note 91.
199. The Oxford English Dictionary, in its entry for the word "may" under the
category of "Law," notes that
[i]n the interpretation of statutes, it has often been ruled that may is to be
understood as equivalent to shall or must. There is no doubt that may, in
some instances, especially where the enactment relates to the exercise of
judicial functions, has been construed to give a power to do the act, leaving
no discretion as to the exercise of the power.
IX THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 501 (2d ed. 1989) (citations omitted). Black's
Law Dictionary also notes that
courts not infrequently construe "may" as "shall" or "must" to the end that
justice may not be the slave of grammar. However, as a general rule, the
word "may" will not be treated as a word of command unless there is some-
thing in context or subject matter of act to indicate that it was used in such
sense. [T]he context in which the word appears must be [the] controlling
factor.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted a similarly worded statute as conveying an
absolute right to bring a case. See Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44
(1941). The Kepner Court noted that "[a] privilege of venue, granted by the legisla-
tive body which created this right of action, cannot be frustrated [by forum non con-
veniens] for reasons of convenience or expense." Id. at 54. Montana and Georgia
follow Kepner by refusing to employ forum non conveniens to dismiss actions brought
under FELA. See Brown v. Seaboard Coast Lines R.R. Co., 229 Ga. 481, 192 S.E.2d
279, 283 (1972); Labella v. Burlington N. Inc., 182 Mont. 202, 595 P.2d 1184, 1187
(1979).
A Texas appellate court, in the first case to use the term forum non conveniens in
Texas, held that a venue statute that said a case "may be brought" conferred a legal
right on the plaintiff to bring and maintain a suit "notwithstanding the defendant's
objections .... [T]he plaintiff has the choice and our courts are not at liberty to deny
him his legal right." Garrett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 218 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949), writ dismissed (citations omitted); see Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 691-
92 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Allen had previously interpreted the Texas Statute as
mandatory and the Texas Supreme Court denied the defendant's Writ of Error. Al-
len v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), writ ref'd; cf. Van Winkle-Hooker
Co. v. Rice, 448 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (reversing lower court's dismissal
of breach of contract case brought in Texas under specific jurisdiction statute and
viewing dismissal as violative of public policy).
200. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (stating that "may"
is not invariably discretionary and depends on legislative intent and context); Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 689 n.53 (1978) (noting that
"may" can mean "shall"); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
that "will" and "must" are not necessarily mandatory); Duncan v. Rolm Mil-Spec
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uses the term "enforced," not "brought," implicitly directing
the court to maintain the case through judgment.2 0 ' Finally,
the Texas Statute encompasses foreign torts and foreign plain-
tiffs.20 2 By allowing foreign plaintiffs and foreign torts since
1913, the Texas Statute directly counteracts the doctrine offo-
rum non conveniens and its principles as utilized by Texas courts
prior to 1913.203
The doctrine of forum non conveniens existed prior to the
enactment of the Texas Statute in 1913, and thus the legisla-
ture may have sought to abolish its use as a defense to wrong-
ful death actions. 0 4 Moreover, the legislature kept the right to
maintain an action for foreign plaintiffs and torts in all revi-
sions of the Texas Statute, even after the Allen v. Bass deci-
sion.20 5 If the Texas legislature viewed Allen as an erroneous
decision, presumably it would have amended the Texas Stat-
ute, as the U.S. Congress enacted the change of venue statute
after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Baltimore and Ohio
Computers, 917 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that legislative intent makes
"may" mandatory); Dalton v. United States, 816 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that "may" is mandatory if legislative intent so indicates); United Hosp. Center,
Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1453 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that "may" is
mandatory or discretionary based on context and legislative intention); United States
v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding that meaning of "may" as
mandatory or permissive is controlled by context), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 996 (1971);
United States v. Reeb, 433 F.2d 381, 383 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating that meaning of
"may" and "shall" depends upon background circumstances, context, and legislative
or administrative intent), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Cos-
tello, 348 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that "may" is mandatory depending
on statute); Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506, 515-16 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (indicating that
"may" is not necessarily permissive), aft'd, 738 F.2d 1556 (11 th Cir. 1984); Koch Ref.
Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 504 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Minn. 1980) (noting
that "may" is mandatory depending on context), aff'd and remanded, 658 F.2d 799
(Em. Ct. App. 1981).
201. See TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a) (Vernon 1986).
202. Id.
203. See Act of April 8, 1913, ch. 161 § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 338; supra note
92 (setting forth Act of 1913); supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing
forum non conveniens in Texas prior to 1913).
204. See Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896);
Morris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 17, 14 S.W. 228 (1890); Missouri, Kan. &
Tex. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Godair Comm'n Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 298, 87 S.W. 871
(1905); Southern Pac. Co. v. Graham, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 34 S.W. 135 (1896).
205. See Act of April 8, 1913, ch. 161 § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 338; Act of
March 30, 1917, ch. 156 § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 365; Act ofJune 19, 1975, ch. 530
§ 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381, 1382; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031
(Vernon 1986).
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R.R. Co. v. Kepner.2 "6
The dissenting arguments regarding the Texas Statute
and Allen are inadequate. The argument that the Texas Stat-
ute's purpose was to counteract the dissimilarity doctrine20 7
overlooks the specific language of the Acts of 1913 and 1917
that accommodates foreign plaintiffs and foreign injuries pur-
suant to certain qualifications and that does not include forum
non conveniens factors.20 8 In addition, Justice Gonzalez disre-
garded the facts that the Acts of 1913 and 1917 did not make
any reference to the application of foreign substantive law that
lies at the heart of the dissimilarity doctrine,2 0 9 and that the
Texas Supreme Court did not lay the dissimilarity doctrine to
rest until 1979. ° Justice Gonzalez's assertion thatforum non
conveniens did not exist in Texas and thus could not have been
206. 314 U.S. 44 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988); see Stein, supra note 15, at
806. Professor Stein notes that "[a]lthough the rationale of the Kepner decision was
bottomed on deference to legislative intent, the decision met with extreme congres-
sional disapproval." Id. He also notes that "Congress expressly responded to the
Kepner case by passing 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the transfer provision for federal courts."
Id. at 807. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[iut is 'impossible
to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents'
affirmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.l (1989) (citing Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In Johnson,
the Court had noted, however, that "[a]ny belief in the notion of a dialogue between
the judiciary and the legislature must acknowledge that on occasion an invitation
declined is as significant as one accepted." Id. at 630 n.7.
207. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Gonza-
lez's dissent).
208. Act of 1917, ch. 156 § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 365; see supra note 94 (set-
ting forth text of Act of 1917). The predecessors of the Texas Statute and the cur-
rent Texas Statute itself convey a right, whether absolute or not, to foreign plaintiffs
to bring an action in Texas. Moreover, the legislature maintained the wording con-
veying this right through subsequent changes of the statute. See Act of 1913, ch. 161
§ 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 338; Act of 1917, ch. 156 § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 365;
Act of 1975, ch. 530 § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381, 1382; TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986); supra note 91 (setting forth text of current Texas
Statute); supra note 92 (setting forth text of Act of 1913); supra note 94 (setting forth
text of Act of 1917); supra note 98 (setting forth text of Act of 1975).
209. See supra notes 92-94 (setting forth texts of Act of 1913 and Act of 1917).
210. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). The Gutierrez court
noted that the Texas Statute, then article 4678, did "not dictate any conflict of laws
rules to be applied by the court." Id. at 314. If the legislature had intended to
counteract the dissimilarity doctrine, the Texas courts would not have continued to
apply the doctrine after 1913 contrary to legislative policy. See supra note 60 (discuss-
ing Texas courts applying dissimilarity doctrine after 1913).
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abolished 21 ' neglected the cases in which Texas courts de-
clined to exercise the jurisdiction they clearly possessed.21 2
Similarly, in attempting to disparage Allen v. Bass as prece-
dent, the dissent did not acknowledge the fact that the Texas
Supreme Court never overruled Allen.2 s In addition, the dis-
sent avoided the fact that the Texas Supreme Court was not
faced with the need to interpret the Texas Statute until the
present case.2t 4 Thus, Allen remains satisfactory precedent for
the court's current interpretation of the Texas Statute.
B. The Due Process Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction Satisfies the
Forum Non Conveniens Goals of Fairness and Justice
The dissenting justices erroneously insist that forum non
conveniens is required to fill in gaps in the due process analysis
of personal jurisdiction.2 15 The U.S. Supreme Court tailored
the parameters of personal jurisdiction in compliance with the
due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution. 1 6 In so
doing, the Court included a number of fairness factors in the
211. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 691 (Tex. 1990) (Gonza-
lezJ., dissenting), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 671 (1991); see supra note 154 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Justice Gonzalez's dissent).
212. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussingforum non conveniens
in Texas prior to 1913). The prerogative of a trial court to decline otherwise valid
jurisdiction-an early manifestation of what was later to be called forum non con-
veniens-existed in Texas prior to 1913. See supra note 55 (discussing Texas courts'
declining to exercise jurisdiction prior to 1913).
213. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679 (discussing court's approval ofAllen); id. at
694-97 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); see supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Justice Gonzalez's dissent). Justice Doggett in his concurring opinion re-
sponded to the dissent by stating that
[Justice Hecht] adopts a strange new reading of opinions, stating that 'Couch
and Flaiz unmistaking disapproved of Allen v. Bass without even bothering to
cite it.' In Texas, we have not subscribed to the theory that opinions may be
overruled without even informing anyone of such action. The doctrine of
stare decisis is not usually discarded in such a cavalier manner through re-
jection of long standing precedent by mere implication. Nothing said by the
court in Couch is at all inconsistent with Allen.
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 682 n.3 (Doggett, J., concurring); see id. at 679.
214. Justice Doggett also noted that "[tihis court never reached the issue of fo-
rum non conveniens in Couch . . . or Flaiz." Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786
S.W.2d 674, 682 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671
(1991).
215. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Cook's
dissent concerningforum non conveniens and personal jurisdiction).
216. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing due process analy-
sis of personal jurisdiction).
855
856 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 14:819
jurisdiction analysis. 2 17  The alleged gap in this analysis
pointed to by the Castro Alfaro dissent 2t 8 thus implies inade-
quacy of the U.S. Supreme Court's tests, or a failure of the
court performing the analysis.21 9 If the court, however, prop-
erly employs the minimum contacts analysis and fairness fac-
tors,2 2 0 forum non conveniens becomes a redundant litigation tac-
tic to defeat the plaintiff permanently.22'
A comparison of the due process fairness factors involved
in the complete personal jurisdiction analysis and theforum non
conveniens factors reveals the redundancy of the latter.222 The
forum non conveniens factors that address obstacles to a fair
trial 223 duplicate the due process goals of fairness and jus-
217. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). TheAsahi
Court noted that
[wie have previously explained that the determination of the reasonableness
of the exercise ofjurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of
several factors. A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the in-
terests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It
must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in further fundamental substantive social poli-
cies."
Id. at 113 (emphasis added); see supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing fair-
ness factors).
218. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 697-702 (Cook, J., dissenting).
219. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 685 n.8 (Tex. 1990)
(DoggettJ., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991); see also Stewart, Forum Non
Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1986) (calling for
elimination of forum non conveniens). Professor Stewart, who is quite critical of the
doctrine, notes that "[w]hen the jurisdictional inquiries are conducted properly, it
becomes apparent that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has outlived its useful-
ness." Id. at 1263.
220. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing minimum contacts
analysis and fairness factors).
221. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 682-83 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Dog-
gett noted that "less than four percent of cases dismissed under the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens ever reach trial in a foreign court." Id. at 683; see Robertson,
supra note 138, at 409. Justice Doggett concluded that "[a] forum non conveniens
dismissal is often, in reality, a complete victory for the defendant." Castro Alfaro, 786
S.W.2d at 683 (Doggett, J., concurring). A commentator notes that "[wihat has hap-
pened in American jurisprudence is a form of 'buck passing' whereby the vague and
amorphous forum non conveniens doctrine has come to accommodate the collective
shortcomings and excesses of modern rules governing jurisdiction, venue, and
choice of law.' " Robertson, supra note 138, at 424 (citations omitted).
222. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing due process analy-
sis of personal jurisdiction); supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text (discussing
forum non conveniens).
223. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
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tice.224 The forum non conveniens factors that deal with the ac-
cessibility of witnesses and evidence 225 parallel the due process
considerations of the reasonableness of the forum226 and the
efficient resolution of the litigation.22 7 Theforum non conveniens
objective to eliminate delay, difficulty and expense 22' dupli-
cates the due process objective of efficient resolution of the
litigation.229
Furthermore, the forum non conveniens factors of over-
crowded courts, burden to the community, and the forum's in-
terest in the litigation 230 duplicate the due process considera-
tions of the state's interest in the litigation,23' the efficient res-
olution of the litigation,2 32 and the fundamental social policy
issues of the states (or countries) involved in the litigation.23 3
Finally, the choice of law element of forum non conveniens 23 4
overlaps the due process concerns of the state's interest in the
litigation, the efficient resolution of the litigation, and funda-
mental social policy issues, 23 5 even though the due process
analysis does not explicitly cover choice of law. A comprehen-
sive due process analysis of personal jurisdiction would thus
make aforum non conveniens analysis unnecessary and render the
doctrine obsolete.
Courts, however, often do not consider the forum's inter-
est in the litigation and attendant factors in their due process
analysis of personal jurisdiction. 23 6 The U.S. Supreme Court
224. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
225. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
226. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at
317.
227. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 93 (1978).
228. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
229. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93.
230. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
231. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
232. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 93 (1978).
233. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93.
234. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
235. See supra notes 229-30, 232-34 and accompanying text (discussing due pro-
cess analysis).
236. See Stein, supra note 15, at 795. Professor Stein states that courts use the
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has itself changed the role these factors should play in deter-
mining personal jurisdiction. 3 7 Some commentators state that
these factors should play no part in the due process analysis
because the factors reflect concerns of state sovereignty rather
than due process.23 8 Other commentators, however, consider
such factors a valid part of the due process analysis of personal
jurisdiction.2 3 9 A comprehensive due process analysis that in-
forum non conveniens analysis to scrutinize the forum's interest in the litigation rather
than consider this factor in the due process analysis of personal jurisdiction. Id. Pro-
fessor Stein also notes that "personal jurisdiction has come to mean power over the
defendant for the purpose of a particular lawsuit, a meaning divorced from mere
physical power over the defendant or her property." Id. at 843.
237. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(stating that trial court should consider forum state interest in litigation); Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10
(1982) (stating that personal jurisdiction requirements protect individual liberty, not
sovereignty and federalism concerns); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (stating that trial court must consider interests of forum state);
Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (stating that
due process clause restricts power of courts in terms of individual liberty, not sover-
eignty).
238. See Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in
the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (1983). Professor
Lewis notes that "[a]s a matter of constitutional law, it should be apparent after Ire-
land that the individual rights determined by the personal jurisdiction dispute need
not be compromised in the name of sovereign interests proclaimed by a self-inter-
ested forum." Id. at 737. In another article, Professor Lewis states that "[t]hese gov-
ernmental interest doctrines have impeded the development of uniform standards
for deciding jurisdictional questions by turning International Shoe's minimum contacts
analysis into a helter-skelter balancing process." Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal
Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984). He
also notes that "a forum unfair to the parties does not become fair simply because
that forum has an interest in deciding the case." Id. In an earlier article, Professor
Lewis noted that "[tihe effect of giving sway to a forum's interests may be to lower
the threshold of fairness to which the defendant is constitutionally entitled." Lewis,
The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses
Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769, 826 (1982); see Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1112,
1121 (1981) (stating that issues of sovereignty are not related to due process).
239. Stein, supra note 15, at 791-92. Professor Stein states that the doctrine of
constitutional personal jurisdiction calls for
considering whether the forum's relationship to the particular controversy
in question justifies assertion of the forum's judicial power beyond its bor-
der, that is, whether the state has a sufficient regulatory stake in the activity
in question to justify the extraterritorial reach of its judicial power. Implicit
in that consideration is a theory of how sovereign power is properly allo-
cated among the states. The due process clause is a relevant consideration
even when the defendant would experience no hardship in coming into the
jurisdiction and has no application to assertions ofjurisdiction over defend-
ants within the forum even when it would be unfair and inconvenient to
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cludes forum interest factors remains a superior test of fair and
just jurisdiction as opposed to the forum non conveniens analy-
sis. 2 4
0
A problem arises when courts often forego the more rig-
orous jurisdictional analysis in favor of theforum non convenens
analysis. 24' Theory and practice regarding jurisdiction and
venue being in disarray, courts tend to rely on forum non con-
veniens as a final filter to prevent unjust litigation.242 In addi-
tion, unlike decisions regarding jurisdiction and venue, thefo-
rum non conveniens decision is not reviewable absent a clear
drag a defendant across a large state. Personal jurisdiction thus reflects in-
stitutional concerns about the proper allocation of authority among sover-
eigns in much the same way that subject-matter jurisdiction addresses the
proper allocation of authority among courts.
Id.; see Stewart, supra note 219 (supporting more comprehensive due process analysis
of personal jurisdiction).
240. Stein, supra note 15, at 843-44. In addition, some states provide long-arm
statutes that place requirements on jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, adding
additional protection to the constitutional requirements. See supra note 82 and ac-
companying text (discussing long-arm statutes). Thus, the presence of state long-
arm statutes that place more stringent jurisdictional requirements on top of constitu-
tional requirements reinforces the superfluous nature of forum non conveniens. See
supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing long-arm statutes).
241. Stein, supra note 15, at 793-94. Professor Stein notes that "[tihe signifi-
cance of this overlap is that most of the policies addressed in decisions about jurisdic-
tion and venue are also addressed in the context of forum non conveniens, a doctrine
practically devoid of hard rules, vested in the discretion of the trial court, and beyond
effective appellate review." Id.; see Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintifls:
Addressing the Unanswered Questions of Reyno, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 577, 609 (1983)
(observing that U.S. courts have not applied Reyno consistently to foreign plaintiffs).
242. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (finding
personal jurisdiction over defendant magazine in state in which it was sold even
though plaintiff availed herself of such forum because it was only state in which stat-
ute of limitations had not run). Contra Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984) (holding that defendant in action arising from heli-
copter crash in Peru lacked sufficient contacts with forum state even though defend-
ant negotiated contract in forum, purchased helicopters and equipment in forum,
and sent employees to forum for training). See Stein, supra note 15, at 783-85 (noting
confusion in jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law jurisprudence). Professor Stein
notes that
[iun the last forty years, an upheaval in the procedural law of private interna-
tional and interstate disputes has occurred. Every doctrine used to mediate
between jurisdictions competing to resolve lawsuits having interstate con-
nections-jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law-has undergone dramatic
change. Both jurisdiction and venue have been greatly expanded, and the
conflicts rules have become more diverse and manipulable.
Id. at 783; see id. at 784 & 789-90. Professor Stein concludes that "forum non con-
veniens doctrine has come to accommodate the collective shortcomings and excess of
modern rules governing jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law." Id. at 785.
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showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court. 43 Thus,fo-
rum non conveniens obscures legitimate jurisdiction and venue
issues rather than resolving them.2 4 4 The best solution re-
mains a stable, complete due process analysis of personal juris-
diction rather than reliance on an unstable, unreviewableforum
non conveniens analysis.2 45
If a court possesses jurisdiction over a case and the de-
fendant through a statute, as in Castro Alfaro, the court's juris-
diction must still satisfy due process requirements.24 6 Further-
more, a court must have jurisdiction before considering aforum
non conveniens argument.247 Justice Doggett pointed out that if
the jurisdiction analysis is properly executed, no gap exists re-
quiring a further forum non conveniens analysis.2 48  The court
either has jurisdiction or it does not. If the court determines
that it has jurisdiction by considering the fairness and justice
factors included in the U.S. Supreme Court's due process anal-
ysis of personal jurisdiction, the court will sufficiently safe-
guard the parties' rights.249
If any of the forum non conveniens factors exist, the court will
thus consider them in its careful personal jurisdiction due pro-
cess analysis.2 -50 If those factors are strong enough to violate
243. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981); see supra notes 40-48
(discussing Reyno).
244. Stein, supra note 15, at 785. Professor Stein finds that the use offorum non
conveniens has resulted in a "crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent deci-
sions." Id.
245. See Stewart, supra note 219, at 1321-24. Professor Stein, however, advo-
cates maintaining the doctrine, but he also calls for the development of rules "em-
bodied in formal doctrine... assertable in a lawsuit and subject to appellate scrutiny
to the same extent as other court-access doctrines." Stein, supra note 15, at 844. He
also advocates an improvement in jurisdictional rules to decrease the need forforum
non conveniens dismissals. Id.
246. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The Gray court noted that "[t]he questions in this case are
(1) whether a tortious act was committed here, within the meaning of the statute...
and (2) whether the statute, if so construed, violates due process of law." Id. at 435,
176 N.E.2d at 762.
247. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
248. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 685 n.8 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
249. See supra note 79 (setting forth fairness factors); Stewart, supra note 219, at
1264. Professor Stewart maintains that the personal jurisdiction analysis should in-
clude private and public forum non conveniens factors. Id. Professor Stewart also as-
serts that any inconvenience should be part of the due process analysis. Id. at 1288.
250. See Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 685-86 (Doggett, J., concurring).
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the U.S. defendant's right to due process, the court must find it
has no jurisdiction over that defendant.25" '
Forum non conveniens, which the trial court can apply quite
loosely in its discretion,2 52 can thus eliminate an otherwise
proper and constitutionally sound finding of jurisdiction.2 53
Commentators suggest that allowing an obscure doctrine,
based on factors which no longer apply in today's technologi-
cal age, to defeat a more carefully constructed set of principles
makes little sense. 254 A careful consideration of due process
and a legislature's desire to empower its courts to hear certain
cases should override a possibly useless but potentially harm-
ful doctrine such as forum non conveniens.
C. The Court's Decision Reflects Sound International Public Policy
The court's refusal to uphold theforum non conveniens dis-
251. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (finding
lack of personal jurisdiction despite minimum contacts). The trial court's exercise of
jurisdiction in Castro Alfaro did not violate the defendants' right to due process. Dow
Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 685-86 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., con-
curring) (noting Texas's substantial interest in case), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671
(1991). Application of due process fairness and forum interest factors to the Reyno
case could result in a finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction because Scotland had
the primary interest in the litigation; Scotland was the most efficient forum; Scotland
was the forum most convenient to the plaintiff; and Scotland was the most reasonable
forum considering the location of all pertinent evidence. See Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Reyno).
252. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235. The Reyno Court held that the 'forum non conveniens
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be re-
versed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 257.
253. E.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987); see Robertson, supra note 138, at 424.
Robertson maintains that "[i]ssues going to the existence ofjurisdiction are concep-
tualized as turning on rules and principles which, however flexible and open tex-
tured, lend an element of solidity that is wholly lacking for discretionary decisions to
decline to exercise jurisdiction." Id.
254. See Stein, supra note 15, at 781-85 (criticizing current court use offorum non
conveniens); Stewart, supra note 219, at 1264 (criticizing doctrine of forum non con-
veniens). Professor Stewart also points out that the defendant's home forum will be
inconvenient only when the forum is in the state of incorporation and that in such
instances, the state does have an interest in the litigation. Id. at 1288. If the forum is
the defendant's principal place of business, jurisdiction should never be unfair. Id. If
jurisdiction is based on defendant's contact with the forum and those contacts are not
related to the litigation, any inconvenience analysis should be part of the due process
analysis. Id. Even Justice Hecht in his dissent admitted that the private inconven-
ience factors no longer applied. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 708 (Hecht, J., dissent-
ing); see supra note 180 (quoting Justice Hecht).
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missal supports international public policy. The court's hold-
ing was proper because elements of the Castro Alfaro litigation
relate strongly to the interests of the state of Texas.255 Despite
the dissent's assertion to the contrary, 256 Texas has an interest
in this litigation because the litigation concerns the manufac-
ture of dangerous goods by corporations that have extensive
operations in Texas.257
U.S. corporations design and make many products like the
pesticide dibromochloropropane in the United States for sale
abroad.258 In addition, the U.S. corporations manufacturing
such products and technologies utilize their profits in the
United States. 259 Thus, U.S. state and federal courts have an
interest in international tort litigation arising from such prod-
ucts and technologies.
In addition, a decision such as Castro Alfaro supports inter-
national public policy by preventing international tortfeasors
255. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 684-86 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring) (discussing Texas interest in litigation), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 671 (1991).
256. Id. at 706-08 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
257. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Castro
Alfaro).
258. See Schneider, Pesticide Makers Fight Export Curb, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990,
§ 1, pt. 1, at 30, col. 1. The reporter noted that two pesticides of the twelve banned
by the U.S. government since 1972 are currently exported, in addition to other pesti-
cides rejected as unsafe by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA").
Id. The EPA does not know, nor will chemical industry officials state, how many
chemicals are exported each year. Id. Manufacturers have mentioned sales around
US$100 million of eight chemicals used in farming. Id. Environmental groups con-
sider this a low estimate. Id. World pesticide sales have doubled since the early
1970s to nearly US$18 billion a year. See Simons, Concern Rising Over Harm From Pesti-
cides in Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at C4, col. 1. The World Health Or-
ganization estimates that nearly one million people suffer from pesticide poisoning,
with approximately 20,000 deaths per year. Id. Simons states that the "U.S. annually
exports about 500 million pounds of pesticides that are banned, restricted, or not
licensed for domestic use." Id. The problem is not limited to the United States. Id.
West Germany, France, and Switzerland, along with the United States, are leading
exporters of pesticides to the Third World. Id. An intense debate over exportation
of hazardous pesticides is dividing the European Community. Id. The U.S. debate,
however, reached an impasse on October 16, 1990, when the U.S. Congress dropped
a proposed export ban from a farm bill. See Schneider, The Budget Battle, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1990, at A24, col. 4. The reporter noted that "[tihe White House, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and the Department of Agriculture agreed with the
pesticide industry that [the ban] was unnecessary and would cost hundreds ofjobs."
Id.
259. See Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 686, 689 (Doggett, J., concurring).
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from escaping liability due to inadequate remedies provided by
alternative fora. 26" By shipping dangerous products such as
dibromochloropropane to Third World nations, the Castro Al-
faro defendants and other U.S. companies avoid the threat of
domestic litigation.26' Often, export to Third World countries
occurs when U.S. corporations can no longer market hazard-
ous products domestically.262 Government attempts to regu-
late such export, in turn, are inadequate.263 Injured Third
260. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 689 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
261. See McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 333 (1985). According to this commentator, corporations "'forum shop' for
countries with lax health and environmental laws, where workers are forced by day-
to-day economic exigencies to work without risk premiums." Id. at 333. The New
York Times reported that Third World farmers use empty pesticide containers to store
water and food, handle pesticides without protective clothing due to the hot climate,
and wash their children's hair with pesticides in order to kill lice. Simons, Concern
Rising Over Harm From Pesticides in Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at C4, col 1.
The Bhopal case and these other situations raise questions of U.S. paternalism and
the propriety of U.S. legislatures and courts protecting Third World populations ar-
guably capable of protecting themselves. Note, Tom Sawyer's Apology: A Reevaluation of
United States Export Policy, 8 HAST. INT'L & COMP.,L. REV. 61, 82 (1984). Economics,
however, controls the lack of regulation in such nations. Id. In turn, U.S. corpora-
tions find opportunities in a regulation-free environment. Id. Exercise ofjurisdiction
by U.S. courts and legislatures over the manufacturing and export of toxic substances
by U.S. corporations is not paternalistic. See Simons, Concern Rising Over Harm From
Pesticides in Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at C4, col. 1. In this article, Arif
Jamal, a Sudanese agronomist, asks, " 'How can a country forbid a poison at home
and yet manufacture it and sell it to other countries? . . . Where is the morality of
this?'" Id. Ultimately, the food sprayed with banned pesticides returns to U.S. ta-
bles for consumption, completing what two writers have named the "circle of
poison." D. WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON: PESTICIDES AND PEOPLE IN A
HUNGRY WORLD 3 (1981).
262. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 688 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Doggett
pointed out that "after the United States imposed a domestic ban on the sale of can-
cer-producing TRIS-treated children's sleepwear, American companies exported ap-
proximately 2.4 million pieces to Africa, Asia, and South America. A similar pattern
occurred when a ban was proposed for baby pacifiers that had been linked to choking
deaths in infants." Id. (citations omitted).
263. See Simons, Concern Rising Over Harm From Pesticides in Third World, N.Y.
Times, May 30, 1989, at C4, col. 1. The EPA estimates that only ten percent of
documents on exports are filed, with most exporters claiming exemptions under EPA
policy. Id. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act requires that all
pesticides used in the United States be registered with the EPA. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a
(1988). Foreign purchasers must furnish a statement acknowledging that the pesti-
cide is unregistered and not for sale in the United States. Id. A copy of such state-
ment must be sent by the EPA to an appropriate official of the foreign country. Id.
§ 136o(a)(2). If a pesticide is canceled or registration suspended, the foreign gov-
ernment must be notified. Id. § 136o(b). Such legislation has not halted the flow of
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World plaintiffs, such as the plaintiffs in Castro Alfaro, attempt-
ing to reach the manufacturers and purveyors of products that
cause their injuries, would most likely be thwarted by the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens.2 64 The Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed this concern by removing the barrier of forum non con-
veniens.
Because international torts often involve significant U.S.
activity, alleged U.S. tortfeasors should not be allowed to ar-
gue that suit in a U.S. court would inconvenience them.265
U.S. corporations actively seek international markets for their
products, yet argue inconvenience when they must defend
their actions in these international markets. 66 U.S. corpora-
tions useforum non conveniens to avoid damages awarded by U.S.
courts, rather than to avoid non-monetary "inconvenience. "267
unregistered pesticides, which has to the contrary increased. See Simons, Concern Ris-
ing Over Harm From Pesticides in Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at C4, col. 1;
Note, supra note 261, at 81. Many countries do not know of these regulations, and
the United States does not notify foreign governments until after shipments have
begun. Id. at 78. In addition, purchasers are often foreign subsidiaries of U.S. ex-
porters who sell the pesticide without regard for safety. Id. In Castro Alfaro, the pur-
chaser was Standard Fruit. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 675
(Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
264. See Note, Jurisdiction: Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens, and Litigation
Against Multinational Corporations, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 202, 209 (1987). Multinational
corporate defendants often useforum non conveniens to delay litigation, and if litigation
commences in a foreign forum, to limit liability. Id. Subsequent litigation after a
forum non conveniens dismissal is rare because dismissal is usually outcome determina-
tive. See supra note 138 (discussing results of forum non conveniens dismissals).
265. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 689 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Doggett
noted that "[w]hen a court dismisses a case against a United States multinational
corporation, it often removes the most effective restraint on corporate misconduct."
Id. In addition, many of the private inconvenience factors have been removed. See
supra note 254 (discussing Justice Hecht's dissent).
266. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. 1990) (Dog-
gett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). Justice Doggett addressed the
defendants' inconvenience arguments:
Over three years after the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Houston, Shell &
Dow obtained a dismissal of the action on forum non conveniens grounds.
Extensive discovery had already been completed, interrogatories had al-
ready been answered by the individual plaintiffs and the individual plaintiffs
had already agreed to appear in Houston for medical examinations and dep-
ositions. Many of the so-called 'convenience' problems had already been
resolved in this litigation prior to the dismissal under forum non con-
veniens.
Id. at 682 n.4 (Doggett, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 682-83 (Doggett, J., concurring). Justice Hecht stated in his dissent
that "it also seems plain to me that the Legislature would want to protect the citizens
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Allowing U.S. corporations to hide from U.S. litigation
permits them to take advantage of lax regulations and cheap
labor in Third World countries.2 6' Furthermore, permitting
U.S. corporations to circumvent U.S. litigation frequently al-
lows them to remain immune from liability due to the inade-
quate fora of the same countries. 269 Thus, the doctrine offo-
rum non conveniens, particularly in cases such as Castro Alfaro, al-
lows U.S. corporations to victimize Third World populations
without penalty. 270 The Texas Supreme Court in Castro Alfaro
correctly interpreted the state's Wrongful Death Statute. The
Castro Alfaro court appropriately abolished an antiquated doc-
trine rendered unjust and unnecessary by contemporary busi-
ness practices and structures.
CONCLUSION
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, the Texas Supreme
of this state, its constituents, from greater exposure to liability than they would face
in the country in which the alleged wrong was committed. This would be incentive
for the Legislature not to abolish the rule of forum non conveniens." Id. at 706 n. 10
(Hecht, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
268. See McGarity, supra note 261 (discussing U.S. export of hazardous materials
and technologies to Third World nations); Note, supra note 261 (discussing U.S. ex-
port of hazardous materials and technologies).
269. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 681 (Tex. 1990) (Dog-
gett, J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). Justice Doggett noted that
"[t]he decision to manufacture DBCP for distribution and use in the third world was
made by these two American companies in their corporate offices in the United
States. Yet now Shell and Dow argue that the one part of this equation that should
not be American is the legal consequences of their actions." Id.
270. See Schneider, Pesticide Makers Fight Export Curb, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990,
§ 1, pt. 1, at 30, col. 1. U.S. manufacturers argue that regulations preventing pesti-
cide exports would aid foreign competitors. Id. Additionally, a vice-president of Du
Pont noted that further regulation "would drive manufacturers to transfer some pro-
duction and research activities overseas." Id. Justice Hecht also expressed concern
that the Castro Alfaro decision would inhibit business in Texas. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 707 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 671 (1991). The conflict between the understandable needs of corpora-
tions and the protection of the world's population, as well as the environment, con-
tinues. See, e.g., Schneider, Pesticide Makers Fight Export Curb, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26,
1990, § 1, pt. 1, at 30, col. 1; Simons, Concern Rising Over Harm From Pesticides in Third
World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at C4, col. 1; Regulations of Pesticides: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, vol. 11 (1983) (containing statements from pub-
lic interest groups and chemical industry representatives regarding the export of pes-
ticides). The Texas Supreme Court, in Castro Alfaro, has moved U.S. law one step
closer to a resolution of this conflict by holding U.S. corporations accountable for
international torts. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W. 2d at 679.
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Court held that a Wrongful Death Statute conferring jurisdic-
tion on a foreign plaintiff precluded a forum non conveniens de-
fense. The court thus abolished the doctrine in Texas for
cases brought under the Texas Statute. The conclusion is
valid, both as an interpretation of the Texas Statute and as an
administration of justice. The doctrine of forum non conveniens,
once valid due to inadequacy of communication and transpor-
tation, has become obsolete, except as a tool for multinational
corporations to avoid litigation over torts committed abroad.
Other jurisdictions should consider a similar reevaluation of
theforum non conveniens doctrine to remove an unnecessary bar-
rier to international tort litigation.
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